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ABSTRACT
REGIME TYPE AND THE PROPENSITY TO NEGOTIATE WITH
INSURGENTS DURING CIVIL CONFLICT
TUBA SENDİNÇ
Political Science, M.A. Thesis, July 2019
Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Mehmet Emre Hatipoğlu
Keywords: terrorism, regime type, civil conflict, autocracy, negotiation
Conventional wisdom in the literature of terrorism suggests that groups using ter-
rorism selectively attack governments based on their expectations about government
compliance. Domestic institutions, in this respect, emerge as one of the important
factors that encourage and/or discourage terrorism. However, researchers have not
empirically addressed how differing domestic institutions condition governmental
responses to terror attacks. This thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature by
examining the interactive effect of regime type and terror attacks on a government’s
tendency to negotiate with insurgent groups during civil wars that took place be-
tween 1989 and 2009 in Africa. Using the regime type categorization by Geddes,
Frantz, and Wright (2014), I find that terror attacks have a positive effect on the
probability of government negotiations with insurgent groups in democracies, single
party regimes, and in military regimes, but a negative effect in personalist regimes.
Prior work on the relationship between regime types and political outcomes suggest
that democracies, single party regimes, and military regimes tend to accommodate
groups using terrorism, due to (i) high costs of repressive counterterrorism measures,
(ii) low tolerance towards civilian casualties, and (iii) constraints on exercise of co-
ercive power. In contrast, terrorism does not translate into government compliance
in personalist regimes, because personalist leaders are (i) immune to political costs
of repressive counterterrorism measures, (ii) unsensitive to civilian casualties, and
(iii) unconstrained in their exercise of coercive power.
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ÖZET
REJİM TÜRLERİ VE SİVİL UYUŞMAZLIK SÜREÇLERİNDE İSYANCILAR
İLE ANLAŞMA YAPMA İHTİMALLERİ
TUBA SENDİNÇ
Siyaset Bilimi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2019
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Mehmet Emre Hatipoğlu
Anahtar Kelimeler: terörizm, rejim türleri, sivil uyuşmazlık, otokrasi, anlaşma
Literatürdeki hakim görüş terör saldırıları yapan grupların saldırı yapacakları hede-
fleri hükümetlerden almayı bekledikleri tepkilere göre seçtiklerini öne sürmektedir.
Bu bağlamda, ülkelerin siyasi kurumsal yapısı terör saldırılarını teşvik eden veya
caydıran önemli faktörlerden biri olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Fakat, araştırmacılar
farklı siyasi kurumların hükümetlerin terör saldırılarına tepkilerini nasıl etkilediğini
inceleyen ampirik bir çalışma henüz gerçekleştirmemişlerdir. Bu tez, rejim türleri ve
terör saldırılarının interaktif ilişkisini 1989 ve 2009 yılları arasında Afrika’da gerçek-
leşen sivil savaşlar süresince hükümetlerin terör saldırıları yapan gruplarla anlaşma
yapma ihtimalini nasıl etkilediğini inceleyerek literatürdeki bu boşluğu doldurmayı
amaçlıyor. Geddes, Frantz, ve Wright (2014) rejim kategorilerininin kullanıldığı
bu çalışma, terör saldırılarının demokrasiler, tek parti rejimleri, ve askeri rejim-
lerde hükümetlerin isyancı gruplarla anlaşma yapma ihtimalini arttırdığını, fakat tek
adam rejimlerinde azalttığını ortaya koymaktadır. Rejim türleri ve siyasi sonuçlar
literatürüne göre, demokrasiler, tek parti rejimleri, ve askeri rejimler terör saldırıları
yapan gruplar ile uzlaşmayı tercih etmekte, çünkü bu rejimlerde (i) baskıcı terör
karşıtı politikaların siyasilere maliyeti yüksek, (ii) sivil kayıplarına karşı siyasi tol-
erans az, ve (iii) baskıcı devlet gücü siyasi kurumlarca kısıtlamalar altında. Bunun
aksine, terörizm tek adam rejimlerinde hükümetleri anlaşma yapmaya teşvik ede-
memekte, çünkü tek adam rejimlerinde (i) baskıcı terör karşıtı politikaların liderlere
olan siyasi maliyeti düşük, (ii) sivil kayıplarına karşı siyasi hassasiyet yeterli değil,
ve (iii) devletin baskı gücü herhangi bir kurumsal kısıtlamaya tabi değil.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is often considered as a rational policy tool for politically discontented
groups to garner government concessions (see, for example, Kydd and Walter 2002),
which indicates that terrorism brings about the expected outcomes for groups that
employ it. However strategic groups are, the literature on terrorism provides incon-
sistent results regarding the effectiveness of this tactic in advancing neither domestic
political goals (see, for example, Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman
2014), nor transnational goals (see, for example, Abrahms 2006, 2012; Atkinson,
Sandler, and Tschirhart 1987; Bloom 2005; Dershowitz 2002; Mueller 2006; Park
and Bali 2017). Scholars of terrorism have long argued that groups target gov-
ernments that are expected to be responsive to terrorism. For instance, empirical
findings suggest that democracies are significantly more likely than others, i.e., au-
tocracies, to be targeted by terror attacks (see, for example, Eubank and Weinberg
1994; Lai 2007; Li 2005; Pape 2003; Schmid 1992; Stanton 2013; Young and Dugan
2011). Such findings point to a possible mechanism where regime type condition
governments’ responses to terrorism.
Some of the canonical explanations connecting level of democracy to the incidence
of terrorism suggests that democracies make attractive targets for terrorism due to
democracies’ sensitivity towards civilian losses and executive constraints that pre-
clude democratic leaders to pursue a retaliatory counterterrorism strategy (see, for
example, Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Kalyvas 2004; Kydd and Walter 2006;
Pape 2003; Stanton 2013). A recent study done by Saygılı (2019) finds that democ-
racies with low levels of regime stability are likely to concede to hostage-taking
terrorism. Such a dichotomous approach to regime types have attracted criticism
from many scholars in the field of comparative politics (e.g. Gandhi and Przeworski
2007; Geddes 1999, 2003) and international relations (e.g. Lai and Slater 2006; Slater
2003; Weeks 2008, 2012), since it fails to capture the qualitative differences among
autocratic regimes. As such, this study moves beyond the question of whether
democracies are more responsive to terrorism than autocracies and contributes to the
debate of how differences within autocratic regimes shape governmental responses
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to terrorism. By employing data on autocratic regime types collected by Geddes,
Frantz, and Wright (2014a), this thesis compares both differences between democ-
racies and autocracies and between democracies and different types of autocracies
in responding to terrorism
This thesis examines which regime types are more responsive to terrorism in the
context of civil wars. Recently, scholars have become interested in analyzing the dy-
namics of terrorism and civil war in relation to each other (Findley and Young 2012;
Fortna 2015; Stanton 2013; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014). During civil
wars, some groups exclusively employ guerrilla attacks, while others combine their
military strategies with terrorism (Fortna 2015; Ganor 2002; Merari 1993; Thomas
2014). For instance, while UNITA in Angola relied on a mixture of guerrilla tactics
and terrorism,1 Chad National Liberation Front (Frolinat) did not employ terror-
ism and only relied on guerrilla tactics. A limited number of studies (Fortna 2015;
Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014) have presented somehow contradictory
results on whether terrorism “works” or does not “work” during civil wars. This
calls for a greater attention from scholars of terrorism and conflict to elucidate the
unexplored causal mechanisms that translate terrorism into success in garnering po-
litical concessions at times of civil wars. Using a sample of cases from civil wars, this
project aims to contribute to this line of literature by investigating which regime
types are likely to respond to the demands of insurgents using terrorism. More
specifically, I will focus on the incidence of negotiations as a measure of success for
insurgents, as negotiations are necessary for insurgents to be granted legitimacy by
their governments and eventually garner political concessions (Thomas 2014).
This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide a discussion on motiva-
tions behind terrorism, especially in the context of civil wars, along with a discussion
on costs governments incur as a result of terror activity. Here, I also outline existing
literature on the effectiveness of terrorism in civil wars and identify several potential
reasons why the empirical findings yield contradictory results on the effectiveness of
terrorism in civil wars.
In Chapter 3, I first provide a glimpse of the literature on the link between regime
type and terrorism where domestic institutions are considered to be important fac-
tors that encourage and/or discourage terrorism. Prior work has presented two
causal mechanisms linking regime type to the incidence of terrorism. The first causal
mechanism suggests that some regime types, i.e., democracies, provide strategic in-
centives (e.g. free media, the tendency to concede) to use terrorism for politically
1Foreign Policy in Focus, February 1, 2002. “Jonas Savimbi: Washington’s Freedom Fighter,” Africa’s
“Terrorist.”” https://fpif.org/jonas_savimbi_washingtons_freedom_fighter_africas_terrorist/ Consulted
on July 4, 2019.
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aggrieved groups (e.g. Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Li 2005; Pape 2003). Building on
this line of thinking, researchers find a positive association between democracy and
the incidence of terrorism. The second causal mechanism, however, suggests that
political access facilitated by democratic institutions reduces the likelihood of terror
attacks as citizens find venues to voice their political grievances and seek solutions.
Scholars in the second camp find a negative association when political participation
and executive constraints are considered in explaining the occurrence of terrorism
(e.g. Eyerman 1998; Li 2005; Young and Dugan 2011).
In Chapter 4, I provide a theoretical account on the effects of terrorism on forc-
ing governmental compliance as conditional on regime type, along with a series of
hypotheses. After providing a theoretical account on democratic responses to terror-
ism, I go beyond the democracy-autocracy dichotomy and discuss the institutional
variation within autocracies and how it shapes the way autocratic governments re-
spond to terrorism. I specifically focus on three main factors in developing my the-
oretical expectations regarding different regimes’ responsiveness to terrorism which
are; costs of repressive counterterrorism measures, sensitivity to civilian losses, and
executive constraints. Accordingly, I hypothesize that terrorism should have a pos-
itive effect on government negotiations with insurgents in democracies, single party
regimes, and in military regimes, but a negative effect in personalist regimes.
In order to conduct empirical analyses to test hypotheses, I combine data on terror
attacks and governmental negotiations provided by Thomas (2014) and on regime
types provided by Geddes, Frantz, Wright (2014a). In Chapter 5, I present an
overview of this combined dataset and provide a discussion on the descriptive statis-
tics. In the following section, I introduce the variables specified in the full model
equation used to test the hypotheses. Then, I report and interpret the empirical
findings in both statistical and substantive terms. I find that terrorism has a positive
effect on the probability of government negotiations with insurgents in democracies,
single party regimes, and military regimes. Still, the results show that terror attacks
have differing effect magnitudes on the probability of negotiations in each regime
type. More specifically, while each terror attack substantially increases the proba-
bility of government negotiations with insurgent groups in democracies, this effect
is marginal in single party and military regimes in substantive terms.
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis and provides a discussion on the key findings from
the empirical analyses. The empirical findings of this research project are in line
with the previous research which argues that groups act strategically in targeting
governments. As the findings suggest, compared to different types of autocracies,
democracies, regimes that are targeted by terror attacks most frequently, have the
3
highest likelihood to negotiate with groups using terrorism. Conversely, personalist
regimes, regimes that are seldom targeted, have the least likelihood to grant nego-
tiations to such groups. The findings also echo the existing literature on varying
government preferences across autocratic regimes, as different types of autocracies
exhibit variation in their responses to terrorism. I finish this chapter by touching
upon the potential limitations of this study.
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2. TERRORISM AS AN INSTRUMENT
Hannah Arendt (1970, p. 51) asserted: “violence is by nature instrumental,” coun-
tering the view that groups using violence are a collection of “crazy,” “evil,” and/or
“angry” individuals.1 Instead, Arendt suggested that violence is thoughtfully em-
ployed as an instrument to achieve ends by individuals and groups. Violence via
terrorism is no different; terrorism is a strategic choice and does not occur “out of
the blue.”2 In this regard, use of terrorism by insurgents is a product of a careful
calculation, especially given the availability of other military tactics, i.e., guerrilla
attacks, at times of civil wars3 to achieve government and/or population compliance.
A clear definition of terrorism is necessary for analytically rigorous research on why
groups and organizations use the instrument of terrorism. Interestingly, however,
little agreement exists on what constitutes a terror act. Indeed, no international legal
definition of terrorism is adopted to date.4 Schmid (1992) identifies 22 different
“definitional elements” of terrorism in his study where he examines definitions of
terrorism used in articles published in leading journals of their fields.
Still, notable agreements on the definition of terrorism have so far allowed strands
of literature to build on each other. First, many scholars have agreed that ter-
rorism is political (see, for example, Crenshaw 1981; Ruby 2002b). “. . . robbery,
homicide, and kidnapping, which are committed in the furtherance of personal or
criminal goals. . . ” are not considered as acts of terrorism (Ruby 2002b, p. 809).
1For a study on the association between mental illness and terrorism, see Ruby (2002a).
2Laitin and Shapiro (2008) provide a review on studies with rationalist approaches to terrorism.
3Instead of providing an abstract definition of civil wars, scholars preferred to determine a set of criteria
in distinguishing civil wars from other forms of conflict. According to most of the criteria, civil wars (a)
involve a fight between agents of a state and nonstate groups who seek to oust their governments or to
change government policies, (b) result in 1,000 battle-related deaths annually, (c) where at least 100 were
killed on both sides (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003).
4UN Security Council member states have passed the Resolution 1566 (2004) that lists violent acts that
qualify as terrorism. However, member states still did not agree on a definition. According to the resolution,
terror activities include “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death
or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general
public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or
an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. . . ” (UN Security Council 2004, p. 2)
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Second, an overwhelming majority of scholars have reached a consensus that the
most important defining characteristic of terrorism is target choice, i.e., civilians
and nonmilitary targets (see, for example, Ganor 2002). Third, groups employing
terror attacks aim to convey a political message to a large audience rather than to
inflict pain on immediate targets (see, for example, Crenshaw 1981; Hoffman 2006;
Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2004). In Hoffman’s words (2006, p. 40-41),
terrorism “is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond
the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear
within, and thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target audience’...” For the purposes of this
study, I will employ the following definition provided by Lake (2002, p. 17): “terror-
ism is the irregular use of violence by nonstate groups against nonmilitary targets
and personnel for political ends.”5
2.1 Terrorism in Civil Wars
Insurgent groups largely rely on guerrilla attacks during civil wars and use terrorism
as a “complementary” military strategy (Fortna 2015; Ganor 2002; Merari 1993;
Thomas 2014). Even though guerrilla and terror attacks converge in terms of their
motivation, i.e., achieving political ends, they differ in terms of their targeting
choice. The main target of guerrilla attacks is military targets, whereas, terror
attacks are directed at civilians and noncombatants (Abrahms 2006; Ganor 2002;
Jongman 2017; Moghadam 2006; Nolan 2002). Following this logic, guerrilla warfare
is defined as “a violent struggle using (or threatening to use) violence against military
targets, security forces, and the political leadership, in order to attain political aims”
(Ganor 2002, p. 296).
Researchers have looked at the potential reasons why insurgent groups might sup-
plement their conventional civil war military tactics with terrorism. Zartman (2008,
p. 7) argues that civil wars are characterized by power asymmetry between a gov-
ernment (strong party) and at least one insurgent group (weak party).6 Because of
this power asymmetry, attacking only on military targets is inadequate for insur-
gent groups to coerce governments effectively, which necessitates seeking additional
5For a discussion on state terrorism and state sponsoring terrorism, see Ganor (2002).
6Zartman (2008) argues that insurgent groups are always disadvantaged compared to their respective gov-
ernments since even in the cases of power parity, insurgent groups suffer from legitimacy problems.
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tactics like terror attacks to increase the costs of fighting for their respective govern-
ments (see, for example, Findley and Young 2012; Hultman 2009; Polo and Gleditsch
2016; Stanton 2013; Wood 2010). To put it in clichéd terms, terrorism is considered
to be the “weapon of the weak.”7 In support of this argument, researchers have found
that the likelihood of terrorism increases if insurgent groups lose a sufficient number
of battles during civil wars (Eck and Hultman 2007; Wood 2010).
Even though civil wars are forms of asymmetric conflict, government victory against
insurgents is not automatic, since “a weak actor’s strategy can make a strong actor’s
power irrelevant” (2001, p. 93-94). Arreguin-Toft (2001, p. 105) suggests that strate-
gies that help weak actors to win against strong adversaries are indirect military
strategies that aim to decrease adversaries’ willingness to fight by attacking non-
combatants and private property, as opposed to direct military strategies that aim
to destruct the military capabilities of adversaries. As such, terrorism appears to be
an indirect military strategy employed to undermine governments’ power and capa-
bilities by asymmetrically imposing costs on governments during civil wars (Hultman
2009; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014). Echoing Slantchev (2003), terrorism
gives insurgents an asymmetric “power to hurt” governments, which might lead to
governmental compliance (Hultman 2009; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014).
By exponentiating the costs of conflict for governments via terrorism, groups seek
to signal governments that ending the conflict is a better option than continuing to
fight.
What are the costs governments incur when faced with a terror attack? First, gov-
ernments suffer from legitimacy loss in the eyes of citizens at times of terror attacks
because (i) terror attacks are considered as a sign of poor protection offered by
governments (Hultman 2009; Kydd and Walter 2006), (ii) citizens become discon-
tented towards their governments at times of repressive counterterrorism measures
(Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Kalyvas 2004; Kydd and Walter 2006), and
(iii) terror attacks might spoil peace processes between governments and discon-
tented domestic groups (Findley and Young 2012; Kalyvas 2006; Kydd and Walter
2006). Second, governments also suffer from direct material costs as a result of ter-
rorism, as terror attacks might (i) displace populations and (ii) decrease economic
activity (Wood and Kathman 2014).
Several scholars suggest that terror attacks might help insurgents to decrease the
legitimacy of a government by showing that the government is not able to protect
its citizens (Hultman 2009; Kydd and Walter 2006). In this regard, Hultman (2009,
7For competing arguments, see Walsh and Piazza (2010), Young and Dugan (2011), Fortna (2015) and
Findley and Young (2015).
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p. 823) argues “by destroying the government’s ability to maintain control, and by
providing that the state is unable to provide security, an insurgent group can force
the government to back down and offer them concessions.” Similarly, researchers
argue that groups might employ terrorism with the aim of provoking governments
to implement repressive, violent, and indiscriminate policies which in turn mitigates
public support for governments (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Kalyvas
2004; Kydd and Walter 2006). When selective targeting is too costly, governments
are more likely to opt for indiscriminate counterterrorism measures during civil
wars (Kalyvas 2004), which directly and indirectly increase insurgents’ power to
hurt governments. Bennett (2008) suggests that excessive coercive measures against
insurgent groups might help insurgents to gain “the hearts and minds” of their pop-
ulation by mounting anger towards governments which leads to increased levels of
support to such groups in the form of material benefits. Governments also suffer
from various other costs as a result of terrorism during civil wars such as internal
displacement of civilians, decrease in economic activity, and alike (Wood and Kath-
man 2014, p. 691). Terror attacks might also help groups to spoil peace processes
and recruit more members that levy costs on governments (Findley and Young 2012;
Kalyvas 2006; Kydd and Walter 2006).
While existing research suggests that governments incur a myriad of costs as a result
of terror attacks, the research on the “success” of this strategy during civil wars in
bringing the desired outcomes for insurgents remains limited. Do governments show
compliance to insurgent groups when faced with a terror attack? Are groups using
terrorism during civil wars more advantageous than groups that do not? In this
respect, the following pages will provide a discussion on the current state of the
literature examining the success and/or effectiveness of terrorism during civil wars.
2.2 Effectiveness of Terrorism in Civil Wars
What is “success” for groups using terrorism during civil wars? Kalyvas (2004,
p. 99) argues that terrorism is carried out during civil wars to “achieve compliance.”8
Governmental compliance is a process where a “government adjusts its behavior to
accord with the coercing party’s given preferences” (Abrahms 2012, p. 371). Existing
8Terror attacks are mainly aimed at achieving governmental compliance. However, several researchers also
point out that population compliance might be another goal that groups seek to achieve through terrorism
(see, for example, Kalyvas 2004; Kydd and Walter 2006).
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studies suggest that government compliance might be observed in various degrees,
forms, and at various stages of a civil war, as researchers conceptualize terrorism’s
success in civil wars as sitting at the negotiation table, obtaining concessions, and
achieving favorable civil war outcomes for insurgents.9
Thomas (2014, p. 806) suggests that negotiations can be a useful tool to examine
the effectiveness of terrorism during civil wars, as governmental concessions and
an eventual peaceful settlement are achieved through a series of formal talks. In
this respect, she shows that sixty-four percent of governmental concessions were
gained in the months insurgents and governments negotiated in civil wars in Africa
between 1989 and 2009 (Thomas 2014, p. 806). Furthermore, sitting at the negoti-
ation table with governments per se is a success for insurgent groups, given many
governments’ policy of “no negotiations with terrorists” to deny legitimacy to groups
using terrorism (Bapat 2005; Crenshaw 1981; Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014) as well
as to discourage the further usage of the tactic (Betts 2002; Bremer III 1992; Carr
1996).
At times when hostage-taking terrorism was very common, American President
Ronald Reagan asserted “America will never make concessions to terrorists.”10 In
this sense, governmental concessions are largely considered as a success for organiza-
tions employing terror attacks. However, using concessions as a measure of success
is not straightforward in the literature, since governmental concessions exhibit a
considerable variation in terms of their volume and importance. Researchers have
stressed the importance of capturing the volume and the importance of concessions
granted to groups using terrorism and operationalized concessions as categorical
(see, for example, Abrahms 2012) or count variables (see, for example, Thomas
2014) to capture the importance and volume of concessions. Governments might
also respond to terror activities by addressing demands fully, partially, or not at all
(Abrahms 2012, p. 371). Similarly, concessions might address substantial political
demands, military demands, as well as some other non-political demands such as
delivery of food, medicine, and supplies (Thomas 2014, p. 371).
Researchers have also looked at civil war outcomes as a measure of success for
insurgents using terrorism, in addition to negotiations and concessions, forms of
governmental compliance that take place during civil wars (Fortna 2015; Wood and
9Abrahms (2007) argues that the effectiveness of terrorism might be examined under two domains which
are “combat effectiveness” and “strategic effectiveness.” The former refers to the ability of groups to inflict
material and human costs on governments via terrorism, and the latter refers to their ability to achieve
their political aims (Abrahms 2007). In this study, I examine the “strategic effectiveness” of terrorism.
10The New York Times, June 19, 1985. “President Bars ‘Concessions’; Orders Antihi-
jacking Steps; 3 More TWA Hostages Freed.” https://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/19/world/
president-bars-concessions-orders-antihijacking-steps-3-more-twa-hostages-freed.html Consulted on
July 1, 2019.
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Kathman 2014). As such, Wood and Kathman (2014) examine the probability of
civil wars ending in negotiated settlements as a result of civilian killing by insur-
gents. Similarly, Fortna (2015) uses a categorical measure of civil war outcomes and
argues that the most favorable outcome during civil wars for insurgents is insurgent
victory and the worst outcome is government victory. Contrary to Wood and Kath-
man (2014), she argues that negotiated settlements are the second-best outcome for
insurgents during civil wars, because negotiations necessitate concessions from both
sides (Fortna 2015, p. 523).
Studies examining the effectiveness of transnational terrorism are abundant, how-
ever, only a handful of studies looked at the success of domestic terrorism, and in
particular, terrorism during civil wars (Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kath-
man 2014). In addition to the theoretical importance and the policy relevance of the
subject matter, studying terrorism in the context of civil wars also helps us to make
a comparison between the groups that employ terrorism and the groups that do not
in terms of the effectiveness of their tactical choice (Fortna 2015, p. 521). Such a
comparison allows researchers to make a stronger causal argument, unlike existing
studies (e.g. Pape 2003) that only examine the success of groups that exclusively
employ terror attacks (Fortna 2015, p. 521). Hence, studying the effectiveness of
terrorism with a sample of cases from civil wars allows researchers to introduce the
necessary variation to examine whether terrorism “works” or “does not work” -or
rather, when it “works.”
Using a sample consisting of the civil wars in Africa between 1989 and 2009, Thomas
(2014) finds that insurgent groups using terrorism, on average, are more likely to ne-
gotiate with their respective governments and to be granted concessions than groups
that do not. Wood and Kathman (2014) find an inverted U-shaped relationship be-
tween civilian killing and the likelihood of negotiated settlements where moderate
levels of civilian killing are positively associated with negotiated settlements, and
very high and very low levels of civilian killing impede termination of civil wars in
diplomatic and peaceful means. In contrast to these studies, Fortna (2015) finds
that groups using terrorism are no more likely to achieve their maximalist goals;
they only achieve some tactical goals that help them to survive longer than others
that do not use terrorism.
The state of existing literature on the effectiveness of terrorism during civil wars call
for a greater attention from scholars, as the empirical findings are somehow incon-
sistent. Some empirical issues should be addressed to understand the contradictions
among empirical findings. First, the inconsistencies in empirical findings might be
attributable to the use of different conceptualizations and operationalizations of
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success for groups using terrorism. While Thomas (2014) considers the incidence
of negotiations and concessions as a success for armed groups, Wood and Kath-
man (2014) and Fortna (2015) examine whether civil wars ended with a favorable
outcome for armed groups using terrorism. In this sense, while a group of studies
focuses on what insurgents gain during conflict (Thomas 2014), another group fo-
cuses on whether the conflict is terminated in a way insurgents desire (Fortna 2015;
Wood and Kathman 2014).
Similarly, these studies employ different measures of terrorism which might be an-
other explanation for these contradictory empirical findings. Young (2019, p. 10)
shows that using different measures of terrorism (e.g. number of terror attacks versus
number of fatalities) might change empirical results.11 While Thomas (2014) uses
the total number of successful terror attacks in a given month, Wood and Kathman
(2014) use the total number of intentional civilian deaths caused by an insurgent
group in a given month. Fortna (2015), in contrast, uses a dichotomous measure
of terrorism that denotes 1 for insurgents that employ indiscriminate high casualty
terrorism.
Whether in the form of concessions or negotiations, terrorism is considered successful
when governments change their behavior. As long as governments do not change
their behavior in response to terror attacks, terrorism would remain an ineffective
tactic during civil wars. Knowing this, groups launch terror attacks against the
governments that, they think, would be responsive to terror attacks in ways that
are favorable to them (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Gaibulloev, Piazza, and
Sandler 2017; Piazza 2007; Stanton 2013; Young and Dugan 2011). The next chapter
will provide a discussion on the research examining the variation in the occurrence
of terrorism across different regime types.
11Young (2019) replicates Chenoweth (2010) and finds that empirical results lose their statistical significance
when number of fatalities caused by terror attacks is used instead of using number of attacks as Chenoweth
(2010) did. As a result, Young (2019, p. 10) suggests that scholars of terrorism should use different
measurements for terror attacks in order to check the robustness of their empirical results and build more
nuanced theoretical expectations.
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3. TERRORISM AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS
In a 2012 speech to Chatham House, David S. Cohen, the U.S. Under Secretary
for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, revealed: “. . . we know that hostage takers
looking for ransoms distinguish between those governments that pay ransoms and
those that do not and make a point of not taking hostages from those countries that
do not pay.”1 Extant research is in line with Cohen’s expectations; groups using
terrorism tend to attack governments selectively. A large body of research on this
topic highlighted the effects of regime type, and in particular the level of democracy,
in encouraging and/or discouraging terror attacks (Eubank and Weinberg 1994;
Eyerman 1998; Gaibulloev, Piazza, and Sandler 2017; Schmid 1992; Stanton 2013;
Young and Dugan 2011).2
Scholars have traditionally relied on two distant but related mechanisms to explain
the link between democracy and terrorism. The first mechanism concentrates upon
the strategic benefits of targeting democracies with terror attacks where mostly a
positive relationship is found between democracy and terrorism (Berry 1987; Eubank
and Weinberg 1994; Kydd and Walter 2006; Li 2005; Pape 2003; Schmid 1992). The
second mechanism, in contrast, implies a negative relationship between the level of
democracy and terrorism by highlighting the political access offered in democracies
that enable aggrieved groups to channel their dissent (Eyerman 1998; Li 2005; Young
and Dugan 2011).
These studies employed a variety of measures of democracy. While some studies
employed the unidimensional Polity 2 score (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2018) to
capture the effects of democracy (e.g. Gaibulloev, Piazza, and Sandler 2017), some
others used a dichotomous variable that distinguishes democracies and autocracies
(e.g. Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Eyerman 1998). Furthermore, several scholars
also employed various other measures that capture the nuances in differing demo-
1U.S. Department of the Treasury, May 10, 2012. “Remarks of Under Secretary David Cohen at Chatham
House on “Kidnapping for Ransom: The Growing Terrorist Financing Challenge”” https://www.treasury.
gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/tg1726.aspx Consulted on July 5, 2019.
2In terms of transnational terror attacks, Savun and Phillips (2009) suggest that foreign policy choices are
better predictors of terror attacks than regime types.
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cratic environments, by using a veto players approach (Young and Dugan 2011),
and by examining the effects of executive constraints and democratic participation
(Li 2005).
The strategic mechanism argues that targeting democracies via terror attacks is
strategically beneficial as media and press freedom in democracies allow groups to
garner sufficient publicity to advertise their attacks, and thus influence a large por-
tion of the populace (see, for example, Eubank and Weinberg 1994). Furthermore,
terrorism is believed to be more accessible and less costly in democracies compared
to autocracies as democratic environments provide groups with the opportunity to
mobilize and organize dissent (Schmid 1992). Another line of thinking that builds
upon the strategic benefits of targeting democracies via terror attacks suggests that
democracies are more prone to make concessions to terrorism as such regimes are
sensitive to civilian losses (Berry 1987; Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003; Stanton
2013).
The political access mechanism presents a negative relationship between the level of
democracy and the incidence of terrorism. Several scholars have argued that democ-
racies provide formal institutions through which aggrieved groups can channel their
dissent which eliminates the need to pursue violent strategies to achieve their aims
(Eyerman 1998). However, researchers have shown that democracies might not al-
ways provide a conducive atmosphere for political change due to the institutions
inherent to democracies. In this respect, Li (2005) finds empirical evidence lending
support to both mechanisms linking democracy to terror attacks where while exec-
utive constraints increase prospects of being targeted by a terror attack, democratic
participation decreases terrorism. In a similar study, Young and Dugan (2011) argue
that democracies with multiple veto players are likely to experience terror attacks
than others since such political environments are prone to deadlocks that make it
hard to change policies. Consequently, groups resort to terrorism to change the
preferences of the veto players and force political change (Young and Dugan 2011).
By using a unified model which captures both mechanisms, Gaibulloev, Piazza, and
Sandler (2017) find a nonlinear relationship between the occurrence of terrorism
and regime type. They maintain that full-fledged autocracies and democracies are
less likely than anocracies to experience terrorism (Gaibulloev, Piazza, and Sandler
2017). This is because, they argue, discontented groups do not have any room to
launch their terror attacks in strict autocracies as such regimes use excessive repres-
sion against anti-government activity, whereas, such groups do not have incentives
to engage in terrorism in well-established democracies as democracies provide po-
litical access and have the capacity to combat terrorism. However, anocracies are
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the most unstable regimes and are very susceptible to terror attacks. (Gaibulloev,
Piazza, and Sandler 2017, p. 519).
Many of these studies have employed the Polity scale as a typical regime type in-
dicator to contrast democracies with autocracies and neglected the variation within
autocracies in experiencing terrorism. During the last two decades, many scholars
in different fields of political science and international relations have started prob-
lematizing such a dichotomous approach in assessing the effect regime type has on
political outcomes (see, for example, Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012; Conrad, Con-
rad, and Young 2014; Davenport 2007a; Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Gandhi and
Przeworski 2007; Geddes 1999, 2003; Kinne and Marinov 2010; Peceny, Beer, and
Sanchez-Terry 2002; Pickering and Kisangani 2010; Slater 2003; Weeks 2008, 2012;
Wilson and Piazza 2013). Scholars have found that different autocracies demonstrate
different abilities to credibly signal their resolve during international crises (Weeks
2008), practiced different levels of repression (Davenport 2007a), had different rates
of survival (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007), had different levels of belligerency during
international crises (Lai and Slater 2006; Slater 2003; Weeks 2012) and experienced
different levels of terror attacks (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012; Conrad, Conrad,
and Young 2014; Wilson and Piazza 2013).
Autocratic regimes might host institutions through which aggrieved groups can mo-
bilize and launch terror attacks. In support to strategic accounts that link regime
type to terrorism, Aksoy, Carter, and Wright (2012) find that autocratic regimes
with opposition parties that have no access to legislation are the regimes most prone
to experience terrorism. Political parties in autocracies allow opponents to overcome
obstacles to mobilization, and if opponents are not given any access to legislation,
they resort to terrorism in pursuit of their political ends (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright
2012, p. 823).
Wilson and Piazza (2013) present a theoretical account that combines strategic
and political access mechanisms in explaining the occurrence of terrorism across
autocratic regimes. They use autocratic regime categorization as a proxy for state
capacity and argue that the variation in terror attacks across autocratic regimes is
attributable to differences in the state capacity in coercing and co-opting dissent
(Wilson and Piazza 2013). Building on the literature on variants of autocratic
regimes, the authors argue that single party regimes have the bureaucratic and
institutional capacity to use a mixture of coercion and co-optation against dissidents
which reduces the likelihood of experiencing terror attacks as groups neither have
enough political grievances to resort to terrorism, nor the opportunity to execute it
(Wilson and Piazza 2013). In contrast, the absence of an institutional environment
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in military and personalist regimes to voice political grievances explains why such
regimes are more likely to experience terrorism (Wilson and Piazza 2013).
Scholars also showed that targeting some autocratic regimes might be strategically
beneficial as they are more prone to make political concessions at times of terror
attacks. Building on the audience costs argument developed by Fearon (1994) and
extended by Weeks (2008), Conrad, Conrad, and Young (2014) argue that autoc-
racies with audience costs, i.e., single party regimes, military regimes, and dynastic
regimes, have the same likelihood of experiencing terrorism with democracies, the
traditional targets of terror attacks, and personalist regimes rarely experience ter-
rorism. They explain that discontented groups expect autocracies with leaders that
are somehow accountable to domestic audiences to be sensitive to civilian losses like
democracies and such groups aim to exploit this sensitivity by launching terror at-
tacks (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014, p. 5). Moreover, single party and military
regimes are responsive to large winning coalitions in which some elements might be
sympathetic to the cause of groups using terror attacks, which makes such regimes
good targets of terrorism through which groups can garner concessions (Conrad,
Conrad, and Young 2014).
3.1 Regime Type and Governmental Responses to Terrorism
The studies examining the relationship between regime type and the incidence of
terrorism largely benefit from a theoretical account based on how varying institu-
tional settings encourage and/or discourage terrorism (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright
2012; Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Eyerman 1998;
Kydd and Walter 2006; Li 2005; Pape 2003; Schmid 1992; Stanton 2013; Wilson and
Piazza 2013; Young and Dugan 2011). However, researchers have not empirically ad-
dressed the extent to which regime type shapes government responses to terrorism.
Even though groups target governments that they expect would capitulate when
faced with terrorism (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Kydd and Walter 2006;
Pape 2003; Stanton 2013), we observe, in reality, considerable variation in the way
governments respond to terror attacks. While some governments grant negotiations
and concessions to groups using terrorism, others do not. This unexplained variance
forces us to bring a systematic explanation to the kinds of calculations governments
carry out regarding their response to groups using terrorism. More specifically, what
role regime type plays in determining such counterterrorism strategies pursued by
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governments?
Only recently, researchers became interested in empirically answering the questions
raised above. Saygılı (2019) stands out as one of the initial attempts in the literature
to explain how domestic institutions predict the variation in government concessions
induced by terror attacks. Using data on government reactions to hostage-taking
terrorism between 1978 and 2005, Saygılı (2019) examines whether democracies
are more prone to pursue an accommodating strategy in managing hostage-taking
incidents and finds that democracies with high levels of regime stability are more
likely than others to concede to hostage-taking terrorism. She explains this finding
by arguing that leaders in democracies with high regime stability can afford the
reputational costs of conceding to hostage-taking terrorism (Saygılı 2019, p. 470).
Conversely, democratic leaders in countries with low levels of regime stability tend
to pursue harsh responses to terrorism as the potential political and security risks of
concessions to groups using terrorism in politically fragile contexts seem to be more
costly than human costs of not conceding.
Many questions regarding the link between regime type and government responses
to terrorism still remain to be answered. First, the issue of bargaining between
governments and groups using terrorism highly influence governmental calculations.
Saygılı (2019) focuses only on how domestic institutions shape government responses
to hostage-taking terrorism, a form of terrorism that implies a unique bargaining
platform where groups demand material benefits in the form of ransoms. However,
groups that employ terrorism often demand other types of concessions from govern-
ments, such as territory, autonomy, and political and social rights. Dealing with
such issues necessitates governments to carry out varying cost-benefit calculations.
In this respect, researchers should examine whether varying demands of groups affect
the way in which domestic institutions condition the effect of terrorism.
While a wealth of studies has looked at differences among autocracies in many
aspects of security (Colgan and Weeks 2015; Croco and Weeks 2016; Debs and
Goemans 2010; Lai and Slater 2006; Radtke 2019; Slater 2003; Weeks 2008, 2012),
no work has so far looked at how different types of autocracies differ with respect
to responding to terrorism as well as how each of these regimes compare vis-à-vis
democracies. In an attempt to address such questions raised above, we need to
establish a valid theoretical framework with a causally coherent set of arguments.
In this study, I will focus on how terror attacks shape government responses to
insurgents during civil conflicts. Focusing on the effects of terrorism in civil wars will
allow me to exploit the variation among groups that use terrorism and groups that
do not and examine whether, and if so, under what conditions, terrorism proves to be
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an effective strategy for insurgent groups (Fortna 2015). Furthermore, investigating
how governments respond to terrorism in civil wars will allow me to articulate the
implications of the institutional variation within autocracies as autocratic countries
are more prone to experience civil war and political instability than democracies
(see, for example, Gates et al. 2006; Hegre et al. 2001).3
3Prior work suggests that this might not be always the case. Buhaug (2006) finds that high levels of
democracy are associated with a high risk to experience a territorial conflict.
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4. TO REPRESS OR TO ACCOMMODATE?
State leaders mostly have responded to terror attacks by either (i) increasing repres-
sion and/or (ii) accommodation of demands of groups using terror attacks at varying
levels.1 According to Goldstein (1978, p. 27), repression is the “actual or threatened
use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as
deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government
personnel, practices or institutions.” Davenport (2007a, p. 1) argues that state re-
pression might appear in the form of “harassment, surveillance/spying, bans, arrests,
torture, and mass killing.” Repression in response to terror activity diverges from
many forms of repression as it aims to discourage a “faceless form of political violence
that requires disproportionate intelligence and some level of community sympathy or
support” (Wilson and Piazza 2013, p. 943). Consequently, repressive counterterror-
ism measures mostly include but are not limited to, intelligence-gathering activities,
large scale government surveillance, the imposition of martial law, and alike (Miller
2007).
Before providing the theoretical account on when governments repress and/or ac-
commodate groups using terrorism, what constitutes accommodation should also
be clearly explained. As noted earlier, scholars conceptualized negotiations, con-
cessions, and incidence of peaceful resolution of conflicts as a success for insurgents
using terrorism during civil wars (Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman
2014). I conceptualize accommodation as the incidence of negotiations in this study.
As mentioned earlier, the incidence of negotiations between governments and insur-
gent groups is a good way of examining the effectiveness of terrorism for several
1Miller (2007) argues that state leaders have five options to choose in combatting to terrorism: doing nothing,
conciliation, legal reform, restriction, and violence (Miller 2007, p. 334). Legal reform is changing laws to
make combating terrorism easy (e.g. expanding police powers), restriction implies steps taken to restrict
groups’ abilities (e.g. gathering intelligence), and violence refers to governmental use of force to discourage
groups from using terror attacks (Miller 2007, p. 335). In this sense, legal reform, restriction, and violence
are forms of governmental repression against terrorism, given Goldstein’s definition of repression. In
contrast, conciliation refers to granting negotiations and concessions to groups using terrorism to discourage
future terror activity (Miller 2007, p. 335). Doing nothing against terror activity is not a common practice
for most of the states (Miller 2007, p. 335). This is because doing nothing against terrorism can jeopardize
leaders’ political survival; as Berry (1987, p. 296) puts it “A target that is incapable of responding to
terrorism will lose public support.”
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reasons (Thomas 2014). First, negotiations per se are hard to achieve between gov-
ernments and insurgent groups (Kaplow 2015). Governments mostly resist sitting
at the negotiation table with insurgent groups, especially the ones that employ ter-
rorism, as they do not want to confer legitimacy to violent groups (Bapat 2005;
Crenshaw 1981; Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014). Second, governments tend to think
that if they concede or legitimize a group using terrorism, other discontented groups
might also embark on a terror activity as a means to extract concessions from a
government that tends to exhibit accommodating behavior (Betts 2002; Bremer III
1992; Carr 1996). Third, negotiations are significant predictors of government con-
cessions to insurgents, since such formal frameworks facilitate a discussion where
insurgents can clearly communicate their demands (Thomas 2014). Thus, convinc-
ing a government to sit on the negotiation table can plausibly be conceptualized as
a success for groups, and needs to be examined further.
To date, many scholars have suggested that the extent to which these options are
chosen is a function of domestic political institutions, i.e., regime type (Crenshaw
1981; Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Kydd and Walter 2006; Li 2005; Pape 2003;
Schmid 1992; Stanton 2013; Wilkinson 1977). Which governments are likely to
repress, and which governments are likely to accommodate when faced with a terror
attack? The following sections provide a theoretical account along with a set of
hypotheses on how regime type influences governments’ calculi regarding responses
to terrorism.
4.1 Democratic Responses to Terrorism
Depending on their institutional configuration, governments show variation in their
ability to employ repression. As such, when faced with a terror attack, democratic
countries are expected to be less likely to repress than autocracies (Crenshaw 1981;
Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Kydd and Walter 2006; Li 2005; Pape 2003; Schmid
1992; Stanton 2013; Wilkinson 1977)2 for several reasons. First, democratic gov-
ernments need to develop counterterrorism measures within the limits of “liberal
norms” in order to not intimidate constituents, the main base of political support
2Several researchers argue that the relationship between the levels of democracy and repression is not linear.
Instead, regimes combining elements of democracy and autocracy are found to be the most coercive regimes
(Fein 1995; Regan and Henderson 2002). Other researchers argue that until a certain level of democracy
is reached, increasing levels of democracy does not exert a negative effect on repression (see, for example,
Davenport and Armstrong 2004).
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for democratic politicians. In this vein, a British counter-insurgency expert, Paul
Wilkinson, argues:
The primary objective of a counter-terrorism strategy must be the pro-
tection and maintenance of liberal democracy and the rule of law. It
cannot be sufficiently stressed that this aim overrides in importance even
the objective of eliminating terrorism and political violence as such. Any
bloody tyrant can ‘solve’ the problem of political violence if he is pre-
pared to sacrifice all considerations of humanity, and to trample down
all constitutional and judicial rights (1977).
As Wilkinson points out, repressive measures in response to terrorism are laden with
negative externalities, such as encroachments to privacy of citizens due to increased
government surveillance, limiting citizens’ mobility due to martial law in a specific
region, and alike.3 After 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government enacted the Patriot Act
which its pundits argued to “[defend] the civil liberties of Americans by reducing
their civil liberties” as the act revised the surveillance laws in the US and allowed the
government to access a considerable amount of private data (Epifanio 2016, p. 713).
According to a Gallup poll conducted in 2003, 67% of Americans did not support
counterterrorism measures that contained significant civil liberty restrictions.4 Sim-
ilarly, Davis and Silver (2004) find that Americans are not supportive of restrictive
counterterrorism measures, if their threat perception is sufficiently low and liberals
are found to be the least likely group to lend support for such policies.
Second, separation of powers in democracies make repressive measures hard to enact
(Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Li 2005).5 Executive branches of governments hold
the coercive power of state apparatus and their actions are largely limited by other
branches of government, i.e., legislation and judiciary, which “inevitably hurts the
government’s ability to repress” (Bapat 2005, p. 709). The legislative branch of
a government may limit executives’ ability to use coercive measures as security
policies should mostly be passed through a legislation process before they are in
effect (Perliger 2012, p. 497). Legislative branches of governments may also raise the
3Compared to indiscriminate repression, selective repression is possible, yet a costly option as it requires
high levels of information and state capacity (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Kalyvas 2004).
4Gallup, September 9, 2003. “Public Little Concerned About Patriot Act.” https://news.gallup.com/poll/
9205/public-little-concerned-about-patriot-act.aspx Consulted on July1, 2019.
5Institutions might also constrain governments in changing repressive policies. Conrad and Moore (2010)
show that as the number of veto powers increases in a government, the likelihood of terminating torture
decreases.
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costs of repression for state leaders by articulating and enforcing international norms
for protecting human rights, as the ratification of international treaties on human
rights is made by legislations. Lupu (2015) shows that international laws protecting
human rights are more effective in reducing state repression when a legislative body
hosts strong opposition parties whose interests diverge with the executive. Similar
to the legislative branch of governments, judiciaries also act as restraining agents
in terms of state repression. Also, Davenport (1996) shows that countries with
independent judiciaries are less likely to repress their populations.
Third, democratic sensitivity to civilian casualties incentivize democratic govern-
ments to accommodate groups using terrorism. Researchers have long investigated
the implications of casualties on democratic governments’ preferences regarding is-
sues of war and peace. Indeed, human costs of war have long been used as a
measure of costs inflicted on states during international conflicts (Gartner, Segura,
and Barratt 2004; Senese 1999; Sweeney 2003). Some researchers showed that casu-
alties affect the duration of militarized interstate disputes (Goemans 2000). Others
showed that as the casualties in a war increase, public approval and support de-
creases (Gartner 2008; Karol and Miguel 2007). The repercussions of human costs
of war at times of international conflict apply to civilian casualties generated by
terror attacks. Democratic governments cannot afford civilian casualties inflicted
by clandestine organizations originated within or outside of their jurisdiction (Kydd
and Walter 2006; Pape 2003).
Prior work on democracy and terrorism presents several implications for the study
of government responses to terrorism during civil wars. First, the political costs
of repression outweigh its benefits for democracies (Crenshaw 1981; Eubank and
Weinberg 1994; Kydd and Walter 2006; Li 2005; Pape 2003; Schmid 1992; Wilkin-
son 1977), as repressive measures do not only negatively affect groups using terrorism
but also the lives of ordinary citizens that might lead to a loss of political support
for leaders in democracies. Second, institutional constraints placed on the execu-
tive power in democracies should lower the ability of democratic executives to carry
out repressive measures against terrorism. Furthermore, at times of terror attacks,
democratic governments cannot stay inactive either; democracies are highly sensitive
to civilian losses (Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003) and democratic governments
might lose public support if they prove ineffective of responding to terror attacks
(Berry 1987, p. 296). In contrast to democratic environments, repressive countert-
errorism measures seem to be easier to implement in autocratic environments, since
autocracies do not face the constraints inherent to democratic rule, which provides a
permissive atmosphere to repress for autocratic leaders (see, for example, Davenport
2007a; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Hathaway 2001; Poe and Tate 1994).
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Existing literature provides us with many insights regarding democratic responses
to terrorism. Given the costs associated with repression as well as the limitations
placed on coercive measures, when faced with a terror attack, I expect democratic
governments to negotiate with groups using terrorism. Conversely, terrorism should
not force autocracies to sit on the negotiation table with insurgents given the per-
missive environment for coercion. If these theoretical expectations hold true, then,
I should find empirical evidence in support of the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Terror attacks increase the likelihood of government negotiations with
insurgents in democracies, however, decrease in autocracies.
Democracies’ accountability to the public might work in the opposite direction as
well. Existing research suggests that democratic leaders’ concerns related to political
survival might highly affect their decision whether to accommodate groups using
terrorism or not. Echoing Fearon (1994), backing down during international crises
can cost democratic leaders elections as public opinion does not favor leaders with
poor performance. Repercussions of backing down in response to terror activity
might be somehow similar; an accommodating attitude, i.e., granting negotiations
and/or concessions, towards groups using terrorism might often be perceived as
backing down and/or a signal of poor performance, and thus risks state leaders’
political survival (Berry 1987; Ritter 2014).
A considerable number of studies surveyed the electoral consequences of accom-
modating policies towards terrorism in democracies (Berry 1987; Chowanietz 2010;
Crenshaw 2000; Friedland and Merari 1985; Gadarian 2010; Getmansky and Zeitzoff
2014; Kıbrıs 2011; Ritter 2014). Many have found that constituents tend to vote
for right-wing political parties under the threat of terrorism, as they are thought
to be “hardliners” against groups employing terror attacks (Bali 2007; Berrebi and
Klor 2006, 2008; Chowanietz 2010; Friedland and Merari 1985; Gould and Klor
2010; Kıbrıs 2011). Kıbrıs (2011), using novel data on the hometowns of Turkish
soldiers who died during the fight against the PKK, finds that constituents in local-
ities where Turkish soldiers were buried tended to vote more for right-wing political
parties during the 1990s which had “no-concessions policy” towards the PKK. Simi-
larly, Getmansky and Zeitzoff (2014) show that Israelis living in the range of rockets
launched from Gaza Strip are more likely to vote for right-wing political parties with
a hard stance against organizations that engage in terrorism.
Considering the potential electoral consequences, leaders might tend to pursue co-
ercive strategies to discourage future terror attacks (Berry 1987; Chowanietz 2010;
Crenshaw 2000; Friedland and Merari 1985; Gadarian 2010; Getmansky and Zeitzoff
2014; Kıbrıs 2011; Ritter 2014). In this respect, terrorism should have a decreasing
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effect on the probability of government negotiations in democracies, since demo-
cratic leaders should demonstrate a hard stance towards terror activity to ensure
their political survival. Conventional wisdom suggests that autocratic leaders do
not necessarily have incentives to accommodate domestic opposition as they can
rely exclusively on repression to deal with domestic opposition (see, for example,
Carey 2006). However, Ghandi and Przeworski (2007, p. 1281) argue “nondemo-
cratic rulers must do more than just avert rebellion” to ensure their political sur-
vival. Thus, considering the adverse effects of accommodating counterterrorism
strategies in democracies and potential incentives of autocracies to accommodate,
my hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1a: Terror attacks decrease the probability of government negotiations
with insurgents in democracies, however, increase in autocracies.
4.1.1 A Bargaining Theory Cut 1
The effect terror attacks have on the propensity of negotiations between governments
and insurgents can also be analyzed through a bargaining framework. Kavaklı,
Chatagnier, and Hatipoğlu (forthcoming) suggest that understanding the creation
of a bargaining space between actors in dispute goes through understanding “the
power to hurt” (Schelling 1966) and “the power to bear costs” (Slantchev 2003).
The authors argue that while actors’ ability to hurt their adversaries increases their
bargaining power, this ability to hurt is a function of targets’ power to bear costs
(Kavaklı, Chatagnier, and Hatipoğlu forthcoming). Targeted actors will not yield
even inflicted high costs as long as they have adequate power to bear the costs.
As noted in Chapter 2, insurgents acquire an asymmetric power to hurt their respec-
tive governments via terrorism (Hultman 2009; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman
2014). However, this thesis argues that the extent of terrorism’s power to hurt gov-
ernments is a function of regime type as different regime types imply different power
to bear costs for governments. How do terrorism’s power to hurt and governments’
power to bear the costs of terrorism change with respect to regime type during civil
wars?
The theoretical account outlined in the previous section implies that terrorism is ex-
pected to create a bargaining space between governments and insurgents in democ-
racies and to preclude the creation of such a bargaining space in autocracies. From
a bargaining perspective, democracies have weaker power to bear the costs of ter-
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rorism than do autocracies. The reason for this difference in the ability to bear
the costs of terrorism in democracies and in autocracies is that the former has a
higher sensitivity to civilian casualties than the latter (Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape
2003). This sensitivity, in turn, gives democratic governments stronger incentives
than autocratic governments to prevent future acts of terrorism. Even though civil-
ian casualties will harm all governments, the costs associated with civilian deaths
will be sufficiently hurtful in democracies compared to autocracies.
The way to preclude future terror activity goes through either repression, or accom-
modation, or, rather through a mixture of both (Miller 2007). However, countert-
errorism measures come with their costs that affect governments in varying ways
depending on the domestic political setting where governments operate. Democra-
cies, in this sense, seem to have fewer options to combat terrorism than autocracies.
Prior work suggests that repressive counterterrorism measures might create discon-
tent among the public, and thus mitigate political support for leaders (e.g. Davis
and Silver 2004). Furthermore, several scholars have argued that democratic govern-
ments are constrained in their ability to enact and implement repressive countert-
errorism measures (e.g. Li 2005). Thus, repressive counterterrorism measures are
both costly and hard to enact and implement in democracies. Absent such costs and
constraints, autocratic governments may easily employ repressive counterterrorism
measures to halt future terror activity. As a result, while terror attacks open up a
bargaining space between governments and insurgents in democracies, they do not
open up a similar bargaining space in autocracies.
However constrained democratic leaders are in applying repressive counterterrorism
strategies, democratic responsiveness towards public opinion might drive leaders
to demonstrate a hardline stance against groups using terrorism. The theoretical
account behind this argument rests on the logic of audience costs. How does the
logic of audience costs and government negotiations with insurgents using terrorism
meet in a bargaining framework? Hypothesis 1a in the previous section suggests
that democratic governments should be less likely than autocratic ones to negotiate
with insurgents involved in the acts of terror. In this line of reasoning, the creation
of a bargaining space is precluded in the presence of terrorism in democracies, as
democratic leaders know that accommodating policies towards terrorism will be
punished by domestic audiences (Chowanietz 2010; Kıbrıs 2011; Ritter 2014). Thus,
democratic leaders’ desire to stay in power might introduce an additional power to
bear the costs of terrorism in democracies. Conversely, terrorism might give rise to
the creation of a bargaining space between autocratic governments and insurgents,
as autocratic governments are neither accountable nor responsive to public opinion
and have incentives to preclude antigovernment activity (see, for example, Gandhi
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and Przeworski 2007).
4.2 Autocratic Responses to Terrorism
Authoritarian regimes seem to exhibit varying levels of ability and incentive to
repress society when faced with anti-government activity (see, for example, Dav-
enport 2007b; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986). In this vein, terrorism
might translate into differing governmental responses across autocracies. O’Donnell,
Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986) argue that autocratic governments consist of hard-
liners and soft liners where the former is likely to opt for repressive policies and latter
is likely to be in favor of concessions when faced with domestic opposition. Due to
the schisms between these two factions, authoritarian regimes employ a mixture of
repression and accommodation as a response to the dissident activity rather than
excessively relying on repression (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986).
In a seminal article, Davenport (2007b) empirically demonstrates that autocracies
vary with respect to their tendency to repress. In his comparison among autocratic
regimes with respect to civil liberty restrictions and personal integrity violations,
Davenport (2007b, p. 490) finds that single party regimes are the least likely group
to violate civil liberties and personal integrity rights, given that single party regimes
have the political and bureaucratic capacity to provide avenues to voice dissent.
Military regimes, Davenport (2007b) shows, exhibit sufficiently low levels of civil
liberty restrictions, yet high levels of violations against personal integrity rights. He
explains this finding with the argument that military regimes are familiar with types
of repression that involve torture, killing, and disappearances, rather than imposing
restrictions like curfews, arrests, and banning (Davenport 2007b, p. 487). Svolik
(2012) provides a similar discussion by arguing that militaries do not automatically
resort to military measures to combat domestic opposition since military raison
d’etre is concentrated upon issues of national security, not necessarily the ones about
internal security. Among all autocracies, personalist regimes appear to be the most
repressive in terms of both civil liberties and personal integrity rights, since a policy
change induced by domestic opposition is not legitimate in the eyes of personalist
leaders (Davenport 2007b, p. 486).
Just like democratic leaders, some autocratic leaders might be in a politically risky
situation when casualties rise as a result of terrorism. Şirin and Koch (2015) show
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that single party and military regimes incur fewer casualties during international
conflicts than do personalist regimes. The reason why single party and military
regimes embark on less costly conflicts in terms of casualties than personalist regimes
is that their winning coalition is larger than that of personalist regimes which make
them sensitive to casualties (Şirin and Koch 2015, p. 810). Following a similar
logic, Conrad, Conrad, and Young (2014, p. 543) suggest that single party regimes
and military regimes should be more likely than personalist regimes to address the
demands of groups using terrorism as their winning coalition represent diverse in-
terests and the demands communicated via terrorism might be appealing to some
portion of the winning coalition. Civilian losses do not constitute a threat for the
tenure of personalist leaders, as they do not depend on larger audiences to ensure
their political survival (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Şirin and Koch 2015).
Also, personalist regimes do not host diverse interests to be represented. Conse-
quently, personalist regimes do not have incentives to embark on a policy change in
an attempt to discourage terrorism (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014).
As an alternative to the variations among autocracies with respect to audience
costs, Wilson and Piazza (2013) exploit the heterogeneity autocratic regimes exhibit
in their state capacities, and argue that different autocratic settings imply different
state capacities to use coercion and/or co-optation against terrorism. In this respect,
they argue that military autocracies are less likely to use co-optive strategies against
terrorism since such regimes lack the necessary institutions (e.g. political parties)
that provide avenues for accommodation (Wilson and Piazza 2013, p. 945). Single
party regimes, in contrast, can employ a mixture of coercion and accommodation
owing to their authoritarian and bureaucratic capacity (Wilson and Piazza 2013,
p. 945).
Extant research suggests that autocracies will exhibit variation when responding
to terror attacks. Single party and military regimes may be more inclined to use
accommodating strategies against terrorism rather than repressive strategies, for
three reasons. First, coercive counterterrorism strategies should be less common
among single party and military regimes, as they are less likely to repress civil
liberties when faced with domestic opposition as shown by Davenport (2007b). Sec-
ond, single party and military regimes are more susceptible to civilian losses than
other autocracies given their political audiences (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014;
Şirin and Koch 2015), which will give incentives to such regimes to accommodate
the demands of groups using terrorism to prevent civilian deaths. Third, prior
work suggests that terror attacks might induce single party and military regimes
to pursue an accommodatşng strategy towards groups using terrorism since their
large winning coalitions might consist of elements sympathetic to the demands of
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such groups (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014). Furthermore, single party regimes
should be more accommodating than military regimes as they have the bureaucratic
capacity to address domestic dissent which is weak in military regimes and absent
in personalist regimes (Wilson and Piazza 2013).
Compared to single party and military regimes, accommodation should be less com-
mon in personalist regimes as encroachments to civil liberties are not politically
costly for such regimes (Davenport 2007b). Furthermore, personalist regimes do not
necessarily have incentives to accommodate terror groups, since their susceptibil-
ity to civilian deaths is considerably lower than single party and military regimes
(Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Şirin and Koch 2015). Furthermore, organized
around one personalist leader, personalist regimes represent only the interests of
the leader (e.g. Geddes 2003) which reduces the propensity of such regimes to ini-
tiate a political process with discontented groups, especially the ones that resort to
terrorism. Drawing from these studies, my second hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Terror attacks increase the likelihood of government negotiations with
insurgents in single party and military regimes, however, decrease in personalist
regimes.
Just like in democracies, the existence of audiences, i.e., single party and military
regimes, might put some mechanisms into effect that encourage governments to
use coercive measures against terrorism. Weeks (2008) argues that single party
and military regimes are susceptible to the punishment of domestic audiences, thus
they choose their policies accordingly. In this respect, showing a positive attitude
towards groups engaging in terrorism might signal the weakness of governments
in single party and military regimes -just like in democracies,- thus single party
and military regimes should not be willing to demonstrate a weak stance towards
terrorism. In contrast, as discussed previously, personalist leaders are not subject to
the punishment of domestic audiences, thus performance evaluation is not a matter
of concern for such leaders. However, still, personalist regimes are considered to
be the most belligerent regimes among autocracies (Weeks 2012), thus, absence of
punishment by audiences should not necessarily encourage personalist regimes to be
more accommodating when faced with a terror attack. Considering this theoretical
account, my last hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2a: Terror attacks decrease the likelihood of government negotiations
with insurgents in single party, military, and personalist regimes.
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4.2.1 A Bargaining Theory Cut 2
The variance in autocratic responses to terrorism during civil wars can also be an-
alyzed in a bargaining framework. As the literature suggests, autocracies exhibit
variation in their ability to tolerate civilian casualties, and thus terrorism. While
leaders in single party and military regimes face threats to their tenure in the pres-
ence of civilian casualties, personalist regimes can ensure their political survival even
when civilians are killed (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Şirin and Koch 2015).
Consequently, terrorism hurts single party and military regimes as much as it hurts
democracies, as single party and military regimes have similar power to bear the
costs of terrorism with democracies.
When hurt by terrorism, what can autocratic governments do in response? Coercive
counterterrorism measures have differing costs for single party and military regimes
and personalist regimes. The former group cannot solely depend on coercive mea-
sures to stay in power. In this respect, Davenport (2007b) shows that single party
and military regimes are less likely to restrict civil liberties than personalist regimes.
Furthermore, elements of the political regime in single party and military autocra-
cies might be sympathetic to the demands of insurgents using terrorism (Conrad,
Conrad, and Young 2014), thus, the ability of leaders in such regimes to implement
repressive counterterrorism measures are constrained. Personalist regimes, in con-
trast, do not host any differing political views (Weeks 2008), thus personalist leaders
are not constrained in their ability to repress terror activity. All in all, terrorism
is expected to create a conducive atmosphere in single party and military regimes
where a bargaining space with insurgents might open up. In contrast, terror activity
against personalist regimes falls short in creating such a bargaining space between
leaders and insurgents.
Just like in democracies, autocratic audiences might drive leaders to pursue a repres-
sive counterterrorism strategy and change the dynamics of the bargaining platform
outlined above. Domestic audiences in autocracies might not be in favor of ac-
commodating counterterrorism measures and the leaders might be driven to follow
a coercive counterterrorism strategy in order to maintain the support of domestic
audiences. Which autocracies are responsive to domestic audiences? As discussed
before, single party and military regimes are considered to rely on the support of
a coalition of diverse interests and personalist regimes are considered to have no
domestic audiences (Weeks 2008). Accordingly, single party and military regimes
might have more power to bear the costs of terrorism than expected owing to their
reliance of support from diverse elements in their political establishment. Hypothesis
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2a aims to capture this theoretical account with respect to governmental responses
to terrorism and suggests that terrorism might fail to create a bargaining space in
single party and military regimes, as such regimes might be driven to apply re-
pression in response to terrorism as a result of the preferences of their domestic
audiences. Following this logic, a bargaining platform should still be hard to mate-
rialize in personalist regimes, as personalist regimes have high levels of power to bear
the costs of terrorism and have no incentives to initiate a bargain with insurgents
using terrorism due to the absence of domestic audiences.
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5. DATA, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In this chapter, I first present an overview of the data used for the empirical analysis
in this study. Then, I provide a discussion about the research design and the model
specification. In the last section, I report and interpret the empirical findings.
5.1 Overview of Data
As noted earlier, the number of studies investigating the effect of terrorism in civil
wars is quite limited (see, Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014).
However, still, researchers have collected adequate data on government responses to
terrorism in civil wars which allow me to empirically test the mechanisms proposed
by the theoretical expectations outlined in above.1 To this end, I use replication
data of Thomas (2014) along with the data on autocratic regime types, i.e., single
party, military, and personalist, collected by Geddes, Frantz, and Wright (2014a).
I build on the data collected by Thomas (2014) because her dataset provides pieces
of information on a very novel measure of success for terrorism in the literature, i.e.,
incidence of negotiations, unlike Wood and Kathman (2014) and Fortna (2015) who
examine civil war outcomes, an intensively studied phenomenon in the literature.
Sitting at the negotiation table is not easy for insurgent groups, especially for the
ones that employ terror attacks, as most of the governments tout the policy of “no
negotiations with terrorists,” in order to not legitimize groups using terrorism (Bapat
2005; Crenshaw 1981; Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014). Furthermore, Thomas (2014)
reports that 64 % of governmental concessions occurred in months following terror
1Replication materials for Wood and Kathman (2014) can be downloaded from http:
//jacobkathman.weebly.com/research.html. To access data to replicate analyses in Thomas (2014)
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/24506&studyListingIndex=
1_aaf02d17e8b389ae30530d8b13de. Replication materials for Fortna (2015) can be downloaded from
http://iojournal.org/do-terrorists-win-rebels-use-of-terrorism-and-civil-war-outcomes/.
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attacks (Thomas 2014, p. 806). As a result, negotiations are important facilitators
of government compliance and needs further attention from scholars examining the
effectiveness of terrorism.
Collected in a dyad-month format, the data cover all cases of civil wars that took
place in Africa between 1989 and 2009 and provide information regarding govern-
ment responses to terrorism, i.e., the incidence of negotiations and the number of
concessions, the number of terror attacks, government characteristics (e.g. GDP
and Polity 2 score), insurgent group characteristics (e.g. insurgent group strength
relative to government and the number of groups in fighting), and civil war dynamics
(e.g. the intensity of conflict and the occurrence of ethnic/territorial war) (Thomas
2014).
The dataset includes 403 cases of negotiations participated by 65 insurgent groups
out of 106, which Thomas (2014, p. 810) defines as “instances of formal bargaining
between the main belligerents in conflict.”2 In coding the incidence of negotiations
between insurgents and governments, Thomas (2014, p. 810) uses news sources from
Lexis Nexis Academic, and other sources like Keesing’s Contemporary Archives and
Jane’s Security and Terrorism Monitor, in addition to each conflict’s historical ac-
counts.
Data on the number of terror attacks perpetrated by each insurgent group come
from from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which covers domestic and in-
ternational terror incidents in all over the world (START 2018). The GTD defines
terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state
actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion,
or intimidation” (START 2018). Our sample only includes cases of domestic terror
attacks which are coded as successful in the GTD.3
I merge Thomas (2014) dataset with Geddes, Frantz, and Wright (2014a) dataset
on regime types to test the conditional effect of regime type on terrorism.4 Geddes,
Frantz, and Wright (2014a, p. 4) define a regime as “a set of formal and/or informal
rules for choosing leaders and policies.” In their dataset, a regime is democratic if
the executive is elected through (i) “a direct, reasonably fair competitive election in
which at least ten percent of the total population (equivalent to about 40 percent
of the adult male population) was eligible to vote,” or (ii) “indirect election by a
2This measure excludes backchannel negotiations and negotiations where third parties involve in bargaining
without no formal communication between the conflicting parties.
3According to the GTD, a terror attack is successful when it causes damage (START 2018).
4Table B.1 in Appendix B presents a cross-tabulation of Geddes, Frantz, Wright (2014a) regime type
categorization and Polity 2 score.
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body at least 60 percent of which was elected in direct, reasonably fair competitive
elections,” or (iii) “constitutional succession to a democratically elected executive.”
(Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a, p. 6).
Table 5.1 Negotiations and Terror Attacks (t-1) across Regime Types
Negotiation
Terror Attack (t-1) Yes No Total
Democracy Yes 2(25%)
6
(75%)
8
(100%)
No 37(18%)
170
(82%)
207
(100%)
Total 39(18%)
176
(82%)
215
(100%)
Party Yes 26(37%)
45
(63%)
71
(100%)
No 43(6%)
732
(94%)
775
(100%)
Total 69(8%)
777
(92%)
846
(100%)
Military Yes 5(4%)
126
(96%)
131
(100%)
No 82(15%)
463
(85%)
545
(100%)
Total 87(13%)
589
(87%)
676
(100%)
Personal Yes 1(2%)
43
(98%)
44
(100%)
No 171(13%)
1130
(87%)
1301
(100%)
Total 172(13%)
1173
(87%)
1345
(100%)
Total 367(12%)
2715
(88%)
3082
(100%)
Note: Percentages show relative frequencies within each row in each cell.
Geddes, Frantz, and Wright (2014b, p. 318) classify autocratic regimes with respect
to (i) control over policy, (ii) leadership selection, and (iii) control of security ap-
paratus. Through this classification, they identify four main types of autocracies,
namely single party regimes, military regimes, personalist regimes, and monarchies
(Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a, p. 12). According to their coding criteria, in
single party regimes, a ruling party controls policy and security apparatus of the
state and determines who can be selected as a leader and military institutions are
primarily responsible for controlling policy and choosing leaders, in addition to con-
trolling security apparatus in military regimes (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a).
A small group organized around one leader gives rise to personalist regimes, as the
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leader and a small clique decide policies and leadership and manage security appara-
tus (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a). Lastly, monarchical regimes are controlled
by a royal family that decides policies, leaders, as well as maintains a huge grip on
security apparatus (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a).
Table 5.1 reports the cross-tabulation of negotiations and the number of terror at-
tacks lagged by one month across all regime types. The table shows that the data
contain 215 democratic months, 846 single party months, 676 military months, and
1345 personalist months. This suggests that almost half of the sample contains
personalist regimes. Table 5.1 shows that democracies and personalist regimes ex-
perienced terror attacks almost in a similar fashion; terror attacks occurred only in
4% of democratic months and 3% of personalist months. In contrast, single party
regimes experienced terror attacks 8% of the time and military regimes experienced
terror attacks 19% of the time.
Democracies appear to have negotiated with insurgents more than other regimes.
Table 5.1 shows that governments and insurgents sat on the negotiation table 18%
of the time in democracies. Single party regimes experienced the lowest number
of negotiations compared to rest of the regimes; only 8% of the time negotiations
occured in single party regimes. Military and personalist regimes seem to have
negotiated with insurgents as frequently as democracies; military and personalist
regimes negotiated with insurgents 13% and 12% of the time, respectively.
A simple look at the relative frequencies among observations where there was at
least one terror attack and where there was no terror attack in the previous month
reveals many patterns on how governmental responses to terrorism change across
regime types. Table 5.1 shows that most of the negotiations in democracies and
single party regimes took place when there was at least one terror attack in the
previous month. Conversely, for military and personalist regimes, negotiations were
more prevalent when there was no terror attack in the previous month.
We should keep in mind that cross tabulations neither imply causality nor show
the partial effect of the main independent variables in question. Due to this, I will
employ a series of regression analyses that allow me to make causal inferences as
well as to see the partial effect of regime type and terror attacks on the propensity
of negotiations with insurgents.
In the following section, I state the full model equation used to test the hypotheses.
Then, after introducing the control variables I use in the regression analyses, I
provide a brief discussion on the descriptive statistics of the variables in the effective
sample.
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5.2 Research Design
The hypotheses stated in the previous chapter are tested using the following model
equation:
Pr(Negotiations=1)=β0+ β1Number of Terror Attacks(t−1)
+β2Party+β3Military+β4Personalist
+β5Number of Terror Attacks(t−1)×Party
+β6Number of Terror Attacks(t−1)×Military
+β7Number of Terror Attacks(t−1)×Personalist
+β8Relative Insurgent Strength+β9Main Group
+β10Intensity+β11External Support for Insurgents
+β12ln(Battle Related Deaths)+β13Number of Conflict Episodes
+β14Conflict Duration+β15Territorial War+β16Ethnic War
+β17Third Party Mediation+β18Number of Groups+β19ln(GDP)
+β20Number of Months Since Last Negotiation
+β21Number of Months Since Last Negotiation2
+β22Number of Months Since Last Negotiation3
+ 
The dependent variable in this study is the incidence of negotiations, binary variable
that takes the value of one if a formal negotiation occurs in a dyad in a given month.
Number of successful terror attacks is a count measure of terror attacks perpetrated
by an insurgent group in a given month. In the sample, this variable ranges from
zero to 49 and has a mean of 0.36, which reveals that terrorism was not observed
in most of the months. I lag this variable by one month in order to account for
endogeneity bias.
Regime type is a categorical variable where zero denotes democratic regimes, one
denotes single party regimes, two denotes military regimes, and three denotes per-
sonalist regimes. Since I expect the effect of terrorism to be conditional on regime
type, I introduce the multiplicative interaction of the number of successful terror
attacks and single party regimes, number of successful terror attacks and military
regimes, and number of successful terror attacks and personalist regimes to the re-
gression in order to test the interactive effect of terror attacks and regime types on
the propensity of negotiations with insurgents. For my main model specifications,
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the baseline regime type category is democracy.
I control for a group of theoretically relevant variables that can potentially ex-
plain government negotiations with insurgents. First, I control for relative insurgent
strength, because governments would be more likely to negotiate when insurgents
are stronger than them. Relatedly, “the mutually hurting stalemate,” a ripe mo-
ment in a conflict that brings parties to the negotiation table, might occur when
governments and insurgents have similar capabilities (Zartman 2008, p. 232). I also
account for external insurgent support, as prior work suggests that involvement of
external actors might prolong civil wars and preclude peace talks as outside actors
introduce additional reservation points to the bargaining set (Cunningham 2010).
Additionally, I include a dummy variable that takes the value of one when an in-
surgent group is a main group in a civil war. Likewise, I account for number of
insurgent groups in a country to control for the effects of a multi-insurgent group
setting on the likelihood of negotiations. Walter (2006) argues that governments
are less likely to pursue an accommodating strategy when multiple groups appear
to be claimants during civil wars. I control for the natural logarithm of number of
battle-related deaths as a proxy for the costs of fighting for governments (Mason and
Fett 1996). To control for state capacity, I use the natural logarithm of GDP. I
also control for conflict duration in months, number of conflict episodes, whether a
civil war in the sample is a territorial war or ethnic war, and whether a third-party
mediation is present.
Additionally, I add a variable that counts the months since the last negotiation and
its second- and third-degree time polynomials to control for temporal dependence
as advised by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). When analyzing time-series cross-
sectional data with a binary response variable, BTSCS, one should account for
temporal dependence because the observations in BTSCS are likely to violate the
independence assumption in logit and probit regressions (Beck, Katz, and Tucker
1998). If there is temporal dependence, the results will be misleading without in-
troducing time polynomials or cubic splines to the model (Beck, Katz, and Tucker
1998). Our data are time-series cross-sectional, and my dependent variable is a bi-
nary response variable which implies that the logistic regression I carry out might
violate the assumption of independence of observations. In order to account for
temporal dependence, I generate the month counter variable and introduce it to
my model specification. Instead of cubic splines, I introduce the second- and third-
degree polynomials of this month counter variable, since Carter and Signorino (2010)
argue that time polynomials present an easier and effective solution to control for
temporal dependence.
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I employ logistic regressions to test the hypotheses as my dependent variable is a
binary variable. I use robust standard errors clustered by conflict in order to account
for conflict specific factors, absent in the regression equation, that may introduce
heteroskedasticity into our estimations.
Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics for Effective Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Negotiations .128 .335 0 1
Number of Terror Attacks(t−1) .282 1.90 0 49
Terror Attack (Dichotomous)(t−1) .086 .280 0 1
Party .267 .443 0 1
Military .236 .425 0 1
Personalist .437 .496 0 1
Main Group .742 .438 0 1
External Support to Rebels .474 .499 0 1
Territorial War .189 .392 0 1
Ethnic War .755 .430 0 1
Third Party Mediation .599 .490 0 1
Intensity 1.22 .414 1 2
Number of Groups 1.77 .724 1 4
Relative Rebel Strength 1.82 .660 1 5
Number of Conflict Episode 1.35 .819 1 6
Conflict Duration (Months) 36.9 36.6 1 192
ln(GDP) 22.3 1.31 19.8 25.3
ln(Battle Deaths) 5.51 1.56 3.21 9.39
Months Since Last Negotiation 18.2 25.8 0 144
Note: The number of observations in the effective sample is 2407.
Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables for the effective sample.
Negotiations and terror attacks are infrequent events given their significantly low
means as shown in the table. Territorial wars are another uncommon phenomena
observed in the effective sample. Similarly, the number of single party and military
regimes is lower than that of personalist regimes. Most of the observations in the
effective sample are cases of civil wars motivated along ethnic lines given the high
mean of ethnic war variable. The variable measuring relative insurgent strength
(that takes on values from one to five where one and two signify weaker insurgent
groups, three signifies equally powerful insurgent groups, and four and five signify
more powerful insurgent groups) has a mean of two, which tells us that most of the
insurgent groups in the effective sample are groups weaker than their respective gov-
ernments. Another related variable, number of groups in fighting has almost a mean
of two, which means that most of the civil cases took place in a multi-group envi-
ronment. Cases of third-party interventions are also very common. Furthermore,
the cases of civil wars in the sample lasted, on average, almost three years.
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5.3 Empirical Findings
The logistic regression estimates from 4 different models are reported in Table 5.3.
For Models 1 through 4, the base regime type category is democracy.5 In Model 1, I
report the results of an additive model where I introduce regime type dummies and
the number of terror attacks, but not their multiplicative interactions. Model 2 is
slightly different than Model 1; I only add temporal controls to this model. Model 3
is an interactive model where I introduce multiplicative interactions of regime type
dummies and number of terror attacks. My full model specification is reported in
Model 4, which includes both the multiplicative interactions and temporal controls.6
The estimates in Models 1 and 2 suggest that executing terror attacks increase the
propensity that targeted governments will come to the negotiation table with insur-
gents as the coefficient on the number of terror attacks is positive and statistically
significant at 99% confidence level in both models. The coefficients on the single
party and military regimes in Models 1 and 2 are not statistically significant, which
suggests that these regimes do not necessarily differ in their responses to insurgent
groups than the baseline regime type, i.e., democracies. In contrast, the coefficients
on the personalist regimes in both models are negative and statistically significant at
95% confidence level; personalist regimes are less likely to negotiate with insurgents
than democracies in the presence of terrorism.
The coefficients associated with control variables in Models 1 and 2 suggest that
relative insurgent strength, number of months in conflict, the existence of third-
party mediation, number of groups in fighting, GDP, and whether the conflict is
emanated from ethnic tensions increase the propensity of negotiations between in-
surgents and governments during civil wars. Including temporal controls, however,
slightly changes the estimates. Model 2 shows that correcting for temporal depen-
5Table A.2 in Appendix A shows the same model estimates where personalist regimes are taken as the
baseline regime type category. According to the estimates, the direction of the effect of terrorism on the
propensity of negotiations with respect to regime types does not exhibit a change from the main models.
Table A.3 in Appendix A reports regression estimates where democratic cases are excluded and single party
and personalist regimes are taken as the baseline regime type category. I plot the average marginal effect
of terror attacks among autocracies where baseline regime type is single party in Figure A.5. According
to the figure, terror attacks have a statistically significant effect on the propensity of negotiations in all
regime types and terror attacks have a positive impact on the probability of negotiations in single party
and in military regimes, and a negative impact in personalist regimes.
6Table A.1 in Appendix A reports regression estimates where a dichotomous terrorism variable is used
instead of a count variable to compare the probabilities of negotiations in the presence and in the absence
of terrorism. Figure A.3 illustrates the marginal effect of terrorism on the propensity of negotiations
across regime types. Figure A.3 shows that terror attacks only have a positive effect on the probability
of negotiations in single party regimes, and a negative effect in personalist regimes. Figure A.4 shows the
predicted probabilities of negotiations with respect to terror attacks across all regime types. According to
the t-statistics, the difference in the probability of negotiations in the absence and presence of terrorism is
not statistically distinguishable from zero in any regime type category.
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pendence decreases the coefficients on the control variables as well as their standard
errors. Additionally, we see in Model 2 that external insurgent support becomes
statistically significant with temporal dependence controls, however, only at 90%
confidence level.
In Model 2, temporal dependence controls are statistically significant at 99% confi-
dence level. The coefficient associated with the month counter variable, i.e., months
since last negotiation, suggests that the propensity of negotiations decreases as the
number of months since last negotiation increases.
Inclusion of temporal controls in Model 2 improves the model fit. The log-likelihood
of Model 2 is higher than that of Model 1, and lower values for Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) in Model 2 suggest that
Model 2 provides a better fit to the data than Model 1. Moreover, according to
the likelihood ratio test I conduct, the inclusion of temporal controls increases the
model fit in a statistically significant way.
Models 3 and 4 are interactive models where I introduce the multiplicative interac-
tions of regime type dummies and the number of terror attacks in order to test the
hypotheses in this study. The only difference between Models 3 and 4 is again the
temporal controls; Model 3 is the restricted model and Model 4 is the unrestricted
model. The log-likelihood in Model 4 is higher than that of Model 3, and, AIC
and BIC values are lower in Model 4 which suggests that Model 4 fits the data
better than Model 3. Moreover, the result of the likelihood ratio test between these
model specifications also indicates that including temporal controls, as in Model 4,
increases the model fit in statistical terms.
Does including multiplicative interactions of regime type dummies and terror attacks
improve the model fit? To determine this, we have to compare Models 1 and 3 and
Models 2 and 4. Table 5.3 shows that Model 3 has a slightly higher log-likelihood
than that of Model 1. Similarly, a slightly lower value for AIC in Model 3 suggests
that inclusion of multiplicative interaction terms is not redundant. However, BIC
value in Model 3 points to the opposite; higher BIC value in Model 3 implies that
Model 1 provides a better fit to our data. The likelihood ratio test I perform
also shows that the addition of multiplicative interaction terms does not necessarily
improve the model fit. A similar situation occurs when we compare the model fit
of Models 2 and 4. Even though Model 4 has a higher log-likelihood than Model 2,
both AIC and BIC values show that Model 2 provides a better fit to our data than
Model 4. Indeed, the likelihood ratio test between Models 2 and 4 also shows that
the interactive model does not perform better than the additive model in improving
our model fit.
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Table 5.3 The Effect of Terror Attacks(t−1) and Regime Type on the Propensity of
Negotiations with Insurgents in Africa During Civil Wars, 1989-2009
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Negotiations Negotiations Negotiations Negotiations
Number of Terror Attacks(t−1) 0.102*** 0.121*** 0.348 0.667***
(0.023) (0.032) (0.221) (0.166)
Party -0.385 -0.292 -0.471 -0.334
(0.624) (0.304) (0.643) (0.305)
Military -0.547 -0.332 -0.522 -0.298
(0.561) (0.267) (0.564) (0.274)
Personalist -1.109** -0.817*** -1.066** -0.770***
(0.523) (0.256) (0.522) (0.257)
Number of Terror Attacks(t−1)×Party -0.165 -0.475***
(0.231) (0.164)
Number of Terror Attacks(t−1)×Military -0.306 -0.591***
(0.218) (0.174)
Number of Terror Attacks(t−1)×Personal -1.501*** -1.461***
(0.284) (0.194)
Relative Insurgent Strength 0.641*** 0.407** 0.637*** 0.408**
(0.224) (0.162) (0.224) (0.162)
Main Group 0.477 0.212 0.496 0.218
(0.350) (0.248) (0.348) (0.249)
Intensity -0.402 -0.276 -0.442 -0.311
(0.342) (0.307) (0.339) (0.301)
External Support to Insurgents 0.565 0.395* 0.533 0.370*
(0.366) (0.220) (0.362) (0.218)
ln(Battle Deaths) 0.002 0.016 0.011 0.025
(0.161) (0.115) (0.162) (0.117)
Number of Conflict Episode -0.463 -0.032 -0.406 -0.018
(0.617) (0.218) (0.597) (0.206)
Conflict Duration (Months) 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Territorial War -0.688 -0.340 -0.701 -0.342
(0.546) (0.405) (0.542) (0.401)
Ethnic War 1.056*** 0.653*** 1.040*** 0.660***
(0.228) (0.203) (0.234) (0.201)
Third Party Mediation 2.316*** 1.659*** 2.281*** 1.646***
(0.430) (0.368) (0.431) (0.373)
Number of Groups 0.354** 0.208* 0.352* 0.210*
(0.179) (0.116) (0.180) (0.116)
ln(GDP) 0.459*** 0.302*** 0.468*** 0.311***
(0.143) (0.102) (0.139) (0.100)
Months Since Last Negotiation -0.286*** -0.288***
(0.046) (0.047)
Months Since Last Negotiation2 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
Months Since Last Negotiation3 -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant -15.821*** -10.366*** -16.034*** -10.606***
(3.339) (2.404) (3.268) (2.358)
N 2407 2407 2407 2407
Pseudo-R2 0.217 0.295 0.221 0.298
Log-likelihood -722.751 -650.289 -718.990 -648.087
AIC 1479.503 1340.577 1477.981 1342.174
BIC 1577.867 1456.300 1593.703 1475.256
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by conflict in parentheses. Baseline category for regime type is democracy.
Two-tailed tests: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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In Model 3, the coefficient associated with the number of terror attacks is not sta-
tistically significant, however, it becomes significant at 99% confidence level when
I add the temporal dependence controls as shown in Model 4. The coefficient as-
sociated with the number of terror attacks in Model 4 suggests that terror attacks
increase the probability of negotiations in democracies, i.e., when regime type takes
the value of zero. Similar to the other models, the coefficients on the single party and
military regimes are not statistically significant. The coefficient on the personalist
regime is statistically significant and negative, which suggests that the propensity
of negotiations is lower in personalist regimes than in democracies in the absence of
terror attacks.
Figure 5.1 Average Marginal Effect of Terror Attacks(t−1) on the Propensity of Nego-
tiations with Insurgents across Regime Types in Africa During Civil Wars, 1989-2009
(Model 4)
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The information provided in Model 4 is somewhat limited as the results do not give
any information on the impact of terrorism on the propensity of negotiations across
all regime types in the sample; we only know that terrorism has a positive impact on
the prospects of negotiations in democracies, i.e., when regime type variable takes
the value of zero. In order to test the interactive effect of regime types and number
of terror attacks on the propensity of negotiations with insurgents, I plot the average
marginal effects of terror attacks on the probability of negotiations across regime
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types in Figure 5.1 as suggested by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006).7
Figure 5.1 demonstrates the average marginal effect of terror attacks on the proba-
bility of negotiations across all regimes with an overlaid histogram of regime types
shown in the effective sample. The x-axis represents regime types in four categories,
i.e., democracy, single party, military, and personalist, and the y-axis represents the
average marginal effect of terror attacks on negotiations conditional on regime type.
An eyeball test shows that the average marginal effect of terror attacks is statistically
significant across all regime types, given the upper and lower bounds of confidence
intervals do not include zero. The p values associated with the marginal effects also
suggest that the marginal effect of terror attacks on the propensity of negotiations
is statistically significant across all regime types at 95% confidence level.
According to Figure 5.1, terror attacks, on average, have a positive effect on the prob-
ability of negotiations in democracies, single party regimes, and military regimes.
In contrast, terror attacks have a negative effect on the probability of negotiations
in personalist autocracies. These results provide partial support to hypothesis 1; in
line with my expectations, terror attacks increase the probability of negotiations in
democracies. However, in hypothesis 1, I also expect that terror attacks decrease
the probability of negotiations in all autocracies, which is clearly not the case as
terrorism has a negative effect on the propensity of negotiations only in personalist
autocracies. Consequently, the findings lend partial support to hypothesis 1. How-
ever, I fail to reject the null for hypothesis 1a; terror attacks do not have a negative
effect on the probability of negotiations in democracies and do not have a positive
effect in personalist regimes. Furthermore, I fail to reject hypothesis 2, since terror
attacks have a positive effect on the propensity of negotiations in single party and
military regimes, but a negative effect in personalist regimes. Also, I reject hypoth-
esis 2a, since the findings suggest that terror attacks have differing effects on the
propensity of negotiations across different autocracies.
In Figure 5.2, I illustrate the predicted probability of negotiations across all regime
types with an overlaid histogram of terror attacks in the effective sample where the
number of terror attacks varies in its in-sample range and all the other covariates are
set to their representative moments. As seen from the confidence intervals around
the point estimates of negotiations for democracies, the difference between the effect
of terrorism on the propensity of negotiations in democracies and in other regimes
is statistically distinguishable from zero. However, confidence intervals around the
7The marginal effect plot for Model 3 can be found in Figure A.1 in Appendix A. According to this figure,
the direction of the effect of terror attacks remains to be positive for single party regimes and negative
for personalist regimes; however, terror attacks lose their significance on the propensity of negotiations in
democracies and in military regimes.
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point estimates for single party and military regimes are overlapping which might
suggest that the effect of terrorism on the propensity of negotiations in single party
and military regimes is not statistically different. In line with this, the t-statistic for
comparing these two categories suggests that the effect terror attacks have on the
propensity of negotiations in single party and military regimes is not statistically
distinguishable from zero.
Figure 5.2 The Effect of Terror Attacks(t−1) on the Propensity of Negotiations with
Insurgents across Regime Types in Africa During Civil Wars, 1989-2009 (Model 4)
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
r(
N
eg
ot
ia
tio
n=
1)
0
20
40
60
80
100
P
er
ce
nt
0 10 20 30 40 50
Number of Terror Attacks
Democracy Party Observed Terror Attacks
Military Personalist
95% CIs
As seen from the predicted probabilities, all regimes have somewhat similar ten-
dencies to grant negotiations to insurgent groups in the absence of terror attacks.
However, with each terror attack, all regime types exhibit a change in their tendency
to negotiate with insurgent groups; democracies become the most likely group and
personalist regimes become the least likely group of regimes to negotiate with in-
surgent groups in the presence of terror attacks.
The point predictions for democracies suggest that each terror attack results in a
substantial increase in the propensity of negotiations with insurgents in democracies.
As such, while the probability of negotiations in democracies in the absence of
terrorism is almost .1, five terror attacks in a given month increases the probability
of negotiations to almost .5. In the case where 10 or more terror attacks are executed
in a given month, the probability of negotiations for democracies is almost one.
The overlaid histogram of terror attacks shows us that most months were with 10
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or fewer terror attacks. Hence, we do not necessarily rely on some hypothetical
values of terror attacks when making inferences regarding democracies’ propensity
to negotiate with insurgents, as we have enough observations with 10 or fewer terror
attacks in our effective sample.8
Single party regimes are the second most likely group to negotiate with insurgents
in the presence of terrorism, however, the effect of terror attacks on the probability
of negotiations in single party regimes is not as substantive as in democracies. In
the absence of terrorism, single party regimes are almost as likely as democracies
to negotiate with insurgent groups. The probability of negotiations, however, is .5
when only 15 or more terror attacks are executed in a given month -a probability
reached in democracies with only five terror attacks. Even though a probability of
.5 is high, the distribution of terror attacks in our effective sample indicates that
the occurrence of 15 or more terror attacks in a given month is very uncommon.
Consequently, even though we see that each terror attack increases the probability
of negotiations in single party regimes, a meaningful increase takes place where our
data do not have many observations as such.
Military regimes are the third most likely group to grant negotiations to insurgents.
The point estimates of negotiations in military regimes show that the probability of
negotiations with insurgents becomes .5 only after 35 or more terror attacks occur
in a given month, a probability that is reached when 15 terror attacks and five terror
attacks are executed in single party regimes and democracies, respectively. As the
distribution of the terror attacks suggests, the occurrence of 35 or more terror attacks
is a very infrequent phenomenon in our effective sample. As a result, although terror
attacks increase in the probability of negotiations in military regimes, this increase
is not substantial and inadequately supported by our data.
In stark contrast to other regimes, terror attacks do not induce personalist regimes to
negotiate with insurgents. Indeed, the probability of negotiations starts to decrease
with the first terror attack in personalist regimes, and each additional terror attack
brings the probability of negotiations in personalist regimes closer to zero. Even
though the probability of negotiations in personalist regimes in the absence of terror
attacks is already quite low, terror attacks decrease the probability even further,
however, not substantially.
8Since the overlaid histogram of terror attacks in this figure shows the terror attacks for all the sample
but not limited to one regime type, I plot the predicted probabilities of negotiations in four different
graphs where the histograms show the distribution of terror attacks in each regime type in Figure A.2
in Appendix A. Figure A.2 suggests that democracies experienced less than three terror attacks in most
of the months. Single party regimes experienced a higher number of terror attacks in a given month,
however, still, experiencing more than three terror attacks in a given month in single party regimes is very
uncommon. Similarly, insurgent groups in military regimes, on average, employed less than five terror
attacks in a given month. The distribution of terror attacks in personalist regimes shows that such regimes
did not necessarily experience high numbers of terror attacks in a given month.
43
Taken together, the findings provide limited support for the hypotheses stated in
the previous section. Governments, in accordance with their regime type, behave in
the expected direction when faced with terror attacks. However, the effect magni-
tude of terrorism is not identical across all regime categories; while terror attacks
substantially increase the probability of negotiations in democracies, and somewhat
in single party regimes, they do not exert a substantive effect on the propensity of
negotiations in military and personalist regimes. Moreover, the effect terror attacks
exert on the propensity of negotiations in single party and military regimes are not
necessarily different, as the overlapping confidence intervals and the t-statistic for
comparing for these two regimes suggests.
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6. CONCLUSION
This thesis finds that terrorism might be effective in forcing government compliance,
but only in some countries contingent upon their institutional setting. As such, the
empirical findings suggest that the effect of terror attacks on government policies
during civil wars is somewhat mediated by regime type. More specifically, I find
that terror attacks exert a positive effect on the probability of government negoti-
ations with insurgents during civil wars in democracies, single party regimes, and
in military regimes, and a negative effect in personalist regimes. Further investi-
gations to test the hypotheses show that the differences in the effect terrorism on
the probability of negotiations in democracies and other regimes, i.e., single party,
military, and personalist regimes, is statistically distinguishable from zero. However,
the difference between the propensity of negotiations with respect to regime type in
single party and military regimes is not statistically different. Predicted probabili-
ties of negotiations across regime types as conditional on terror attacks also suggest
that terror attacks substantially increase the propensity of negotiations in democra-
cies, and somewhat in single party and military regimes. Conversely, terror attacks
decrease the likelihood of negotiations in personalist regimes. All in all, insurgent
groups can force governments to sit on the negotiation table via terrorism, only in
democratic countries.
When faced with terrorism, leaders have two options; repression and/or accommo-
dation. The extent to which a government can apply one or both is a function if
its regime type. Repression might appear to be a better option than accommoda-
tion in combatting terrorism; however, repression is not priceless -for most of the
political regimes. In this vein, costs of repressive counterterrorism policies are suf-
ficiently high in democracies as repressive counterterrorism measures involve many
negative externalities (Davis and Silver 2004; Epifanio 2016; Wilkinson 1977). In
other words, repressing terror activity does not only affect groups using terrorism
negatively but also, the lives of ordinary citizens. In this sense, I argue that the
high tendency democracies exhibit in negotiating with insurgents in the presence of
terrorism is attributable to the high costs of repressive counterterrorism measures.
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Like democracies, repression is not a preferred option for single party and military
regimes, however, personalist regimes frequently resort to terrorism in the face of
domestic opposition (Davenport 2007b). Building on this logic, I argue that the
causal mechanism that explains the link between terror attacks and high likelihood
of negotiations with insurgents in single party and military regimes is the reluctance
of such regimes to repress civil liberties. Conversely, personalist regimes do not have
institutional and strategic incentives to respond to terrorism in an accommodating
way, thus they are less likely to pursue conciliatory policies to respond to terrorism.
Second, sensitivity towards civilian losses appears to be an important factor ex-
plaining why some governments tend to “give in” to groups using terrorism. Extant
literature is abundant with studies examining how human costs of war affect gov-
ernments’ policies at times of international conflict (Gartner, Segura, and Barratt
2004; Goemans 2000; Senese 1999; Şirin and Koch 2015; Sweeney 2003). Researchers
argue that democracies have less cost tolerance than autocracies in terms of casual-
ties, given that democratic leaders depend on public approval and votes to remain in
office. Likewise, scholars of terrorism have argued that terror attacks place an enor-
mous amount of cost on democratic governments as the number of civilian casualties
rise (Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003; Saygılı 2019). Following these arguments, I
argue that democracies are more likely to accommodate groups using terrorism due
to their high sensitivity towards civilian casualties. Contrary to the common under-
standing, autocracies are not homogenous in terms of their cost-benefit calculations
with respect to civilian casualties. Following scholars who argue that casualties
imply varying costs to different types of autocracies (Conrad, Conrad, and Young
2014; Şirin and Koch 2015), I argue that the political costs of civilian losses are high
enough to force single party and military regimes to sit on the negotiation table with
insurgents using terrorism. In contrast, a decline in public support as a result of
civilian casualties by terror attacks does not jeopardize the tenure of a personalist
leader, as such leaders do not depend on popular support to maintain office.
Institutional constraints constitute another factor that precludes some regimes to
pursue coercive counterterrorism measures, which, in turn, leaves governments with
limited options in countering terrorism and thus force them to grant negotiations to
insurgents during civil wars. Democracies, in this sense, are the most institutionally
constrained regimes than all the others, as democratic executives are highly checked
and balanced by other branches of government, i.e., judiciary and legislative (Bapat
2005; Eubank and Weinberg 1994; Li 2005; Lupu 2015; Perliger 2012). Similarly,
single party regimes and military regimes have some degree of institutionalization
and bureaucracy (Geddes 2003; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a; Weeks 2008),
which make them more likely to respond to terrorism with conciliatory measures.
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Moreover, elements of the political establishment in single party and military regimes
might be sympathetic to the demands of groups using terrorism, thus negotiations
with such groups might occur as a result of pressure from inside the regime (Conrad,
Conrad, and Young 2014). Personalist regimes, on the other hand, exhibit the lowest
levels of institutionalization and bureaucratic capacity (see, for example, Geddes
2003; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a; Weeks 2008, 2012), which in turn allows
personalist leaders to make decisions without consulting to any other political actor
and thus less likely to pursue accommodation with politically aggrieved groups.
This thesis echoes previous findings on regime type and the occurrence of terrorism
(e.g. Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Stanton 2013; Young and Dugan 2011).
Democracies are consistently found to be the “better” targets for terror activity,
since democracies depend on popular vote and constrained enough to not pursue a
fully retaliatory counterterrorism strategy (e.g. Stanton 2013). The findings of this
thesis are also in line with the prior work on the heterogeneity among autocracies
in experiencing terrorism where researchers argue that single party and military
regimes experience more terrorism given that they have domestic political audiences
that punish the leaders, and personalist regimes experience less terrorism, since the
odds of political change are dire (Conrad, Conrad, and Young 2014; Kydd and
Walter 2006; Pape 2003; Stanton 2013).
The empirical findings of this project are also in line with the literature on the vari-
ation within autocratic regimes with respect to government preferences on various
policy domains (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Geddes 1999; Geddes, Wright, and
Frantz 2014a; Lai and Slater 2006; Slater 2003; Weeks 2008, 2012). As such, the
findings show that single party and military regimes and personalist regimes have
varying cost-benefit calculations regarding how to respond to terrorism.
Several limitations remain for this study. First, I use only one measurement of ter-
rorism, the number of terror attacks, which might bias the estimations since the
number of terror attacks does not necessarily capture the damage inflicted on gov-
ernments via terrorism. By using the number of terror attacks to capture the effects
of terrorism, I assume that the effect of a terror attack resulting in one civilian
death and the effect of another terror attack resulting in 100 civilian deaths are
identical. In this respect, Young (2019) argues that using different terrorism mea-
sures (e.g. number of fatalities, number of attacks, number of suicide attacks, and
discriminate/indiscriminate terrorism) might yield different results, thus, employing
different measures of terrorism to check the robustness of the empirical findings in
this study is necessary.
Another limitation of this study is about the external validity of the findings. The
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dataset employed in the analyses covers observations only from Africa. Even though
many conflict scholars have focused on Africa exclusively in their quantitative and
qualitative research projects, however, the analyses should be replicated in different
parts of the world to talk about the generalizability of these findings. Thomas (2014)
argues that patterns of political violence and terrorism in Africa are compatible with
those in different parts of the world. However, in this study, domestic institutions
and regime type turn out to play a prominent role, and thus we need adequate
variation in domestic institutional setting. Even though the sample in this study
provides us with enough variation to conduct the regression analyses, however, there
might still be some factors unique to African regimes that might bias the estimates.
For instance, Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) provide an extensive discussion on
how the neo-patrimonial aspect of African regimes render African governments and
politics distinctive than the rest of the world.
In addition to its advantages noted in previous chapters, restricting the sample to
the universe of cases in civil wars might also appear to be a limitation of this study.
Existence of a civil war might introduce a systematic factor that affects some regimes
in particular ways, which might bias the estimations. For instance, Hutchison (2014)
shows that domestic conflicts increase the public’s willingness to extend civil rights
and liberties. Democracies, single party regimes, and military regimes might be ac-
commodating to groups using terrorism, not necessarily because they use terrorism,
but because the public opinion is already in favor of peaceful resolution of conflicts.
Furthermore, the presence of a civil conflict weakens governments in many aspects,
during and after civil conflicts. Collier (1999) argues that civil wars destroy resources
and infrastructure which dampens economic growth and development. In this sense,
this study does not necessarily talk about the responsiveness and/or unresponsive-
ness of regimes in the face of terror attacks at all times, but only at times of civil
wars. Consequently, the analyses in this thesis should be replicated in politically
stable contexts in order to have a deeper understanding on the interactive effect of
regime type and terrorism on the propensity of negotiations between governments
and insurgents during civil wars.
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APPENDIX A
Figure A.1 Average Marginal Effect of Terror Attacks(t−1) on Negotiations with
Insurgents across Regime Types (Model 3)
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Table A.1 The Effect of Terrorism(t−1) (Dichotomous) and Regime Type on Nego-
tiations with Insurgents
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Negotiations Negotiations Negotiations Negotiations
Terror Attack(t−1) 0.131 0.444* 0.546 0.889*
(0.233) (0.250) (0.462) (0.472)
Party -0.276 -0.268 -0.472 -0.362
(0.625) (0.305) (0.661) (0.312)
Military -0.521 -0.309 -0.475 -0.290
(0.557) (0.262) (0.561) (0.277)
Personalist -1.114** -0.817*** -1.070** -0.779***
(0.522) (0.254) (0.521) (0.257)
Terror Attack(t−1)×Party 0.195 -0.115
(0.536) (0.508)
Terror Attack(t−1)×Military -1.001* -0.706
(0.577) (0.691)
Terror Attack(t−1)×Personalist -2.023*** -1.785***
(0.504) (0.463)
Relative Insurgent Strength 0.625*** 0.392** 0.613*** 0.393**
(0.221) (0.159) (0.216) (0.160)
Main Group 0.461 0.194 0.490 0.214
(0.352) (0.252) (0.347) (0.248)
Conflict Intensity -0.368 -0.249 -0.429 -0.292
(0.335) (0.306) (0.331) (0.298)
External Support to Insurgents 0.586 0.409* 0.561 0.383*
(0.359) (0.217) (0.357) (0.217)
ln(Battle Deaths) 0.004 0.019 0.013 0.026
(0.158) (0.116) (0.160) (0.118)
Number of Conflict Episode -0.494 -0.044 -0.446 -0.036
(0.644) (0.231) (0.637) (0.220)
Conflict Duration (Months) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Territorial War -0.734 -0.323 -0.669 -0.304
(0.568) (0.417) (0.541) (0.404)
Ethnic War 1.045*** 0.645*** 0.995*** 0.640***
(0.226) (0.201) (0.233) (0.201)
Third Party Mediation 2.332*** 1.671*** 2.270*** 1.653***
(0.417) (0.359) (0.418) (0.365)
Number of Groups 0.346* 0.204* 0.341* 0.205*
(0.177) (0.114) (0.180) (0.116)
ln(GDP) 0.470*** 0.307*** 0.482*** 0.314***
(0.139) (0.101) (0.134) (0.098)
Months Since Last Negotiation -0.291*** -0.291***
(0.047) (0.047)
Months Since Last Negotiation2 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
Months Since Last Negotiation3 -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant -16.032*** -10.468*** -16.220*** -10.620***
(3.269) (2.383) (3.197) (2.325)
N 2407 2407 2407 2407
Pseudo-R2 0.212 0.292 0.216 0.294
Log-likelihood -727.373 -653.216 -723.164 -651.483
AIC 1488.745 1346.431 1486.328 1348.966
BIC 1587.109 1462.154 1602.050 1482.048
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by conflict in parentheses. Baseline category for regime type is de-
mocracy.
Two-tailed tests: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure A.3 Marginal Effect of Terrorism(t−1) (Dichotomous) on Negotiations with
Insurgents across Regime Types (Model 8)
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Figure A.4 The Effect of Terrorism(t−1) (Dichotomous) on Negotiations with Insur-
gents across Regime Types (Model 8)
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Table A.2 The Effect of Terror Attacks(t−1) and Regime Type on Negotiations with
Insurgents (Personalist Regimes as Baseline)
Model 9 Model 10
Negotiations Negotiations
Number of Terror Attacks(t−1) 0.121*** -0.794***
(0.032) (0.110)
Democracy 0.817*** 0.770***
(0.256) (0.257)
Party 0.525** 0.436*
(0.224) (0.227)
Military 0.485*** 0.472***
(0.152) (0.147)
Democracy × Number of Terror Attacks(t−1) 1.461***
(0.194)
Party × Number of Terror Attacks(t−1) 0.985***
(0.114)
Military × Number of Terror Attacks(t−1) 0.869***
(0.113)
Relative Insurgent Strength 0.407** 0.408**
(0.162) (0.162)
Main Group 0.212 0.218
(0.248) (0.249)
Conflict Intensity -0.276 -0.311
(0.307) (0.301)
External Support to Insurgents 0.395* 0.370*
(0.220) (0.218)
ln(Battle Deaths) 0.016 0.025
(0.115) (0.117)
Number of Conflict Episode -0.032 -0.018
(0.218) (0.206)
Conflict Duration 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
Territorial War -0.340 -0.342
(0.405) (0.401)
Ethnic War 0.653*** 0.660***
(0.203) (0.201)
Third Party Mediation 1.659*** 1.646***
(0.368) (0.373)
Number of Groups 0.208* 0.210*
(0.116) (0.116)
ln(GDP) 0.302*** 0.311***
(0.102) (0.100)
Months Since Last Negotiation -0.286*** -0.288***
(0.046) (0.047)
Months Since Last Negotiation2 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
Months Since Last Negotiation3 -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant -11.183*** -11.376***
(2.467) (2.427)
N 2407 2407
Pseudo-R2 0.295 0.298
Log-likelihood -650.289 -648.087
AIC 1340.577 1342.174
BIC 1456.300 1475.256
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline regime type category is personalist.
Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.3 Additive and Interactive Effects of Terror Attacks(t−1) and Autocratic
Regime Type on Negotiations with Insurgents
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
Negotiations Negotiations Negotiations Negotiations
Number of Terror Attacks(t−1) 0.113*** 0.173*** 0.113*** -0.769***
(0.034) (0.062) (0.034) (0.111)
Party 0.661*** 0.580***
(0.200) (0.198)
Military -0.180 -0.116 0.482*** 0.464***
(0.155) (0.152) (0.150) (0.144)
Personalist -0.661*** -0.580***
(0.200) (0.198)
Party × Number of Terror Attacks(t−1) 0.942***
(0.107)
Military × Number of Terror Attacks(t−1) -0.094 0.848***
(0.069) (0.115)
Personalist × Number of Terror Attacks(t−1) -0.942***
(0.107)
Relative Insurgent Strength 0.371** 0.374** 0.371** 0.374**
(0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158)
Main Group 0.393 0.411 0.393 0.411
(0.293) (0.292) (0.293) (0.292)
Intensity -0.239 -0.276 -0.239 -0.276
(0.327) (0.320) (0.327) (0.320)
External Support to Insurgents 0.387* 0.367 0.387* 0.367
(0.229) (0.228) (0.229) (0.228)
ln(Battle Deaths) -0.059 -0.052 -0.059 -0.052
(0.130) (0.132) (0.130) (0.132)
Number of Conflict Episode -0.266 -0.227 -0.266 -0.227
(0.261) (0.260) (0.261) (0.260)
Conflict Duration (Months) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Territorial War -0.781* -0.792* -0.781* -0.792*
(0.433) (0.434) (0.433) (0.434)
Ethnic War 0.718*** 0.714*** 0.718*** 0.714***
(0.214) (0.213) (0.214) (0.213)
Third Party Mediation 1.799*** 1.783*** 1.799*** 1.783***
(0.429) (0.432) (0.429) (0.432)
Number of Groups 0.222** 0.224** 0.222** 0.224**
(0.112) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113)
ln(GDP) 0.333*** 0.339*** 0.333*** 0.339***
(0.104) (0.101) (0.104) (0.101)
Months Since Last Negotiation -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.272***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Months Since Last Negotiation2 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Months Since Last Negotiation3 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -10.812*** -11.038*** -11.474*** -11.619***
(2.502) (2.453) (2.582) (2.538)
N 2266 2266 2266 2266
Pseudo-R2 0.312 0.313 0.312 0.313
Log-likelihood -591.327 -589.779 -591.327 -589.779
AIC 1220.655 1221.557 1220.655 1221.557
BIC 1329.444 1341.798 1329.444 1341.798
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline for Model 12-13 is single party and for Model 14-15 is personalist.
Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure A.5 Average Marginal Effect of Terror Attacks(t−1) on Negotiations with
Insurgents among Autocracies (Model 12) (Single Party Regimes as Baseline)
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APPENDIX B
Table B.1 Cross Tabulation of Polity 2 and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014)
Regime Type Categorization
Polity 2
Regime Type
(Geddes et al. 2014)
Autocracy
(-8/-6)
Closed Anocracy
(-5/0)
Open Anocracy
(1/5)
Democracy
(6/8) Total
Democracy 20 93 23 98 234
Party 157 439 255 8 859
Military 205 348 135 0 688
Personalist 525 811 61 0 1,397
Total 907 1,691 474 106 3,178
Note: Unit of analysis is dyad-month.
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Table B.2 The Effect of Regime Type on Negotiations with Insurgents
Model 15
Negotiations
Party -0.107
(0.316)
Military -0.261
(0.245)
Personalist -0.757***
(0.250)
Relative Insurgent Strength 0.404***
(0.153)
Main Group 0.188
(0.256)
Conflict Intensity -0.218
(0.305)
External Support to Insurgents 0.417**
(0.213)
ln(Battle Deaths) 0.007
(0.119)
Number of Conflict Episode 0.009
(0.231)
Conflict Duration (Months) 0.006***
(0.002)
Territorial War -0.579
(0.411)
Ethnic War 0.634***
(0.208)
Third Party Mediation 1.715***
(0.354)
Number of Groups 0.163
(0.119)
ln(GDP) 0.313***
(0.100)
Months Since Last Negotiation -0.283***
(0.046)
Months Since Last Negotiation2 0.009***
(0.003)
Months Since Last Negotiation3 -0.000**
(0.000)
Constant -10.665***
(2.489)
N 2471
Pseudo-R2 0.286
Log-likelihood -676.905
AIC 1391.809
BIC 1502.244
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by conflict in
parantheses. Baseline regime category is democracy.
Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure B.1 The Effect of Regime Type on Negotiations (Model 15)
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